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1Part I
Introduction
This dissertation contains three essays that model private entitiescross border activities
in the presence of contractual imperfections, and apply techniques in applied macroeco-
nomics to verify the theoretical results derived. The rst essay sets up a decentralized
international borrowing arrangement to study the channel through which the absence
of formal enforcement on a debt contract between citizens can slacken private sectors
credit constraint in the international asset market. The second empirical paper completes
the rst essay via investigating, in a sample consisting of 73 developing and emerging
market countries over the period 2004-2009, whether weaker domestic debt enforcement
is associated with a larger amount of external debts owed by private sectors to outside
creditors. The last essay turns to the eld of vertical intrarm trade, where I build an
incomplete contract framework to show that the number of foreign a¢ liates (extensive
margin) accounts for a greater share of the changes in aggregate intrarm trade than
the variation in the average exports per a¢ liate (intensive margin). This prediction is
estimated using a 2007 cross-industry dataset on the number of a¢ liates as well as their
shipments to parent multinational companies headquartered in the United States.
In particular, the rst essay studies the e¤ects of private international debt on risk
sharing and welfare, where individual residents are assumed to have access to both inter-
national and domestic asset markets. Like Jeske (2006), the assumption is that domestic
2residents cannot commit to repay their debts across borders. Unlike the previous litera-
ture, the novel feature in this paper is the introduction of unenforceable debt contracts
within borders. The pervasive risk of default creates heterogeneity in marginal rate of
substitution (MRS hereafter) for countries that are, as a whole, participation constrained
in the international asset market. This leads to harsher punishment for international
debt defaulters and hence allows more international risk sharing than a complete market
setup. The paper shows how this improvement depends upon the interaction between
the endogenous borrowing constraints in either market. The second essay tests whether a
countrys strength of enforcing domestic debt contract can exert a negative inuence on
its private sectors ability to borrow in the international asset market. Quality internal
institution raises post-default value on external debt, which in turn may cause foreign
creditors to tighten credit constraint. This hypothesis is based on the notion that the
positive e¤ects of both international contract enforcement and the broad quality of insti-
tutions have been successfully distinguished and controlled for in the data. In a dataset
consisting of 73 developing and emerging market countries, I nd that private sectors in
countries with more e¢ cient domestic courts accumulate relatively less debt owed over-
seas. In the third essay, The rm-level approach to intra-industry trade reveals that the
variation in the number of exporters or exported varieties (extensive margin) accounts
for a greater share of the changes in aggregate trade than the variation in the average
exports per rm-variety (intensive margin). Using Bureau of Economic AnalysisU.S.
Multinational Company data of 2007, this paper shows vertical intrarm trade follows a
similar pattern. Like Antràs (2003), the share of intrarm imports in total U.S. imports
3is found to be higher, the higher the headquarters intensity of the exporting a¢ liates
in foreign countries. This paper further demonstrates this increase in imports is mainly
due to the establishment of a large number of foreign a¢ liates. In addition, lower trade
barriers and a better investment environment in a country attract greater amounts of
U.S. direct investment, and this attraction materializes mostly in terms of new a¢ liates
than in terms of more sales per existing a¢ liate. The endogenous choice of optimal
number of a¢ liates can be rationalized in a theoretical framework that combines three
ingredients Antràsproperty-rights model, Melitzs heterogeneity view on productivity
applied to a¢ liates, and a multiproduct setup. Therefore, the papers key contribution
lies in identifying the extensive margin of intrarm trade headquarters-intensive rms
tend to integrate larger numbers of productive suppliers as a¢ liates, and will redraw
their boundaries under trade liberalization.
4Part II
Private Debt with Pervasive Risk of
Default
1 Introduction
In the presence of limited commitments, regardless of complete asset markets, interna-
tional loans are made available only to the extent their repayments can be enforced by
the threat of imposing penalties to the debtor country, such as innite reversion to au-
tarky. This commitment problem creates limited risk sharing among countries, and the
risk-sharing size is determined by the specication of outside options. Jeske (2006) ar-
gues that in economies where domestic debt contracts are enforceable but international
contracts are not, a centralized setting where only a government borrows internationally
and redistributes domestically may allow more capital ows and thus achieve a higher
social welfare than a decentralized arrangement, where individuals have access to capital
markets. This is because individuals can continue to insure consumption risk through
domestic complete and frictionless asset markets even after defaulting on international
debt and therefore their implied (endogenous) debt constraints are tighter. A central
planner by construction does not have an alternative insurance option and its aggregate
participation constraints are relatively loose.
5This paper asks what if domestic debts are too unenforceable. Compared to interna-
tional defaulters who are excluded from foreign markets but retaining access to domestic
markets, domestic defaulters are penalized harsher by exclusion from all markets. This
degree of creditor discrimination seems more realistic than the previous one where do-
mestic creditors are fully protected. The lack of legal enforcement in domestic debts has
opposite e¤ects on a small open economys welfare. On the one hand, it may hamper
internal risk sharing (negative e¤ect), but on the other hand, it intensies punishment
for external debt default and induces increments in infusion of overseas capital (positive
e¤ect). The logic behind the latter is that international defaultersscheme of using the
non-defaulted as intermediaries to reaccess external markets will be restricted in an im-
perfect domestic environment. The question then becomes which e¤ect dominates. The
positive e¤ect overwhelms suggests that the object of welfare comparison is a private in-
ternational debt setup with complete domestic markets. The reason is that agents on the
edge of domestic default enjoy an increase in foreign capital inow, while domestically
unconstrained agents remain una¤ected. When centralized borrowing is the benchmark
for comparison, welfare e¤ects can go either way. The paper demonstrates in a numerical
example that centralization is superior only if the endowment structure is such that in-
come uctuation across countries is large relative to variation across agent types within a
country. Hence, there exists a rationale for government in decentralized economies with
extensive wealth disparity to sacrice domestic debts enforcement for more international
risk sharing.
The prevalence of default risk also causes a hierarchy of pricing rules. In closed
6economy models, domestic interest rate is the lowest rate possible to ensure repayment.1
In open economies with enforceable domestic debts, the international interest rate is
determined by the lowest domestic interest rate in di¤erent countries around the world,
and MRS within any country is equalized.2 The feature in this model is a nested rate
structure: domestic interest rate in a constrained country equals to the lowest rate among
all residents, and international rate in turn equals to the minimum domestic rate. This
wider gap between international and domestic nancing costs raises the international
borrowing quota and rewards domestically constrained agents with a higher utility level.
Of critical importance in this literature is what defaulters might be entitled. Several
related works replace complete exclusion3 with partial exclusion, under which defaulters
retain some access to markets or have alternative ways to smooth consumption. This
causes international risk sharing to diminish further in size, since life after a default is
less painful than it would otherwise be. Partial exclusion arises if defaulters can reenter
the international asset market indirectly through intermediaries as in Jeske (2001; 2006).
Wright (2006) builds on Jeskes model and argues that international borrowing subsidies
can also lead to constrained e¢ cient allocations, instead of Jeskes radical way of cen-
tralization. A defaulter continuing to take advantage of international savings gives rise
to partial exclusion as well. Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) rst use this idea and prove that
borrowing cannot be supported in a small open economy that takes the international in-
terest rate as given (partial equilibrium). Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2007) carry their work
1See, e.g., Alvarez and Jermann (2000; 2001); Azariadis and Lambertini (2002).
2See, e.g., Jeske (2006); Wright (2006).
3See, e.g., Kehoe and Levine (1993); Kocherlakota (1996); Alvarez and Jermann (2000); Kehoe and
Perri (2002; 2004).
7forward to a multi-country (general equilibrium) setup, where they show international
risk sharing can exist with low interest rates. Then, Wright (2006) establishes some
equivalence between the above two modeling methods on partial exclusion, if the extra
dimension of heterogeneity among residents in Jeskes model is accommodated. Reduced
penalty can be due to other internal opportunities. For instance, Kehoe and Perri (2002;
2004) study international risk sharing in a real business cycle model with productivity
shock, where the autarky value depends upon the quantity of capital the country has ac-
cumulated up to default. Defaulters continue to produce and employ capital in autarky,
but are not allowed to buy or sell capital and other nancial assets. Broner and Ven-
tura (2011) assume that countries cannot discriminate against foreign creditors. Thus,
international risk sharing is obtained even in the absence of default penalty. Unlike this
papers model, where residents make default decisions (decentralized arrangement) and
the government only decides whether or not to enforce domestic debt, the government
in their setup makes default decisions on behalf of all residents (sovereign default) and
chooses endogenously whether to enforce all debt contracts or none. Broner and Ventura
(2011) show a decrease of trade barriers in goods market facilitates international trade
and raises the cost of enforcement. As a result, government may favor enforcing none
after globalization to prevent large amount of capital outow at the cost of hampering
domestic trade. Similar to their ndings, the government in this study also chooses not
to enforce in order to encourage international capital inow at the expense of hindering
domestic risk sharing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
8and derives equilibrium results. Section 3 compares the social welfare in a private in-
ternational debt setup with that under a centralized arrangement. Section 4 introduces
a simple example aimed at illustrating the essence of the problem. Section 5 concludes,
followed by a technical Appendix A at the end of this dissertation.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of a nite number of countries denoted as m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg.
Each country is populated by a nite number of types, denoted by n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng, with
a continuum of residents in each type. Time t is innite and discrete. Information is
indexed by state t 2  and history t  f0; 1; :::; tg 2 t with 0 given. Transi-
tion probability from history t to the next periods state t+1 is known as 
 
t+1jt

.

 
t

is the unconditional probability of observing t, and 
 
rjt is the probability
of observing r conditional on having been in t. There is one non-storable goods de-
noted by emn
 
t

, the endowment of type n in country m at t, and by cmn
 
t

, the
corresponding consumption. M + 1 number of one-period maturity securities are traded
in the economyM domestic bonds for each country and one international bond. Let
bmn
 
t; t+1

and fmn
 
t; t+1

, respectively, be the amounts of domestic and international
state-contingent bonds held by type n in country m, purchased at t and for payment
next period in state t+1; pm
 
t; t+1

and q
 
t; t+1

are their respective prices. Use
 2 (0; 1) as the discount factor and denote U () as the single-period utility function,
which is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously di¤erentiable. A
9representative resident of type n living in country m has preference,
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) ;
after t with t 2 [0;1).
Risk of default is pervasive in a sense that debt contracts between any two parties
are not enforced. Border is still important because default on domestic bond leads to a
harsher punishment than the penalty for default on international bond. To be specic,
domestic bond defaulters are denied access to both domestic and international asset
markets forever, thereby receiving a utility level of Residents Autarky (RA),
Amn (
r) 
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
 (sjr)U (emn (s)) ; (RA)
given the domestic default happened at r. In contrast, international bond defaulters
prohibited from any future access to the international asset market can still trade bond
overseas indirectly through borrowing from other non-defaulted residents in the domes-
tic asset market. I will hereafter refer to this situation as Residents International
Autarky (RIA), which o¤ers the following post-default value given the international
default occurred at t.4
V mn
 
t; bmn
 
t
  max
fcmn (r);bmn (r;r+1)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) ; (RIA)
4Since individuals inuences are miniscule relative to the market, a single international bond defaulter
does so by assuming that domestic bond prices stay unchanged after her default.
10
subject to the budget constraint,
emn (
r) + bmn (
r) > cmn (r) +
X
r+1
pm (r; r+1) b
m
n (
r; r+1) ; (RIA-BC)
the participation constraint in the domestic asset market,
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
 (sjr)U (cmn (s)) > Amn (r) ; (RIA-PC)
and the no-Ponzi game condition,
bmn (
r; r+1) >   B;
with bmn
 
t

and fpm (r; r+1)gr2[t;1) given, 8r with r 2 [t;1). B > 0 is su¢ ciently
large to ensure compactness of the budget set. Let

cm;Dn (
r)
	
r2[t;1) be the optimal
consumption path to the (RIA) problem with initial history t and inherited obligations
bmn
 
t

. First order condition with respect to cmn (
r) is
mn (
r) = r t
 
rjtU 0  cm;Dn (r)
241 + rX
s=t
X
rjs
mn (
s) t s
 (rjs)

 
rjt
35 ; (1)
where mn (
r) and mn (
r) denote, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers on the budget
constraint (RIA-BC) and the domestic participation constraint (RIA-PC) if r occurs.
The outside options for both domestic and international bond defaulters have been
dened at this point. Next, the Residents Problem (RP) at period 0 is established
11
before any default.
max
fcmn (t);bmn (t;t+1);fmn (t;t+1)gt2[0;1)
1X
t=0
t
X
t

 
t

U
 
cmn
 
t

; (RP)
subject to the budget constraint,
emn
 
t

+ bmn
 
t

+ fmn
 
t

(RP-BC)
> cmn
 
t

+
X
t+1
pm
 
t; t+1

bmn
 
t; t+1

+
X
t+1
q
 
t; t+1

fmn
 
t; t+1

;
the participation constraint in the international asset market,
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) > V mn  t; bmn  t ; (RP-IPC)
the participation constraint in the domestic asset market,
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) > Amn  t ; (RP-DPC)
and the no-Ponzi game conditions,
bmn
 
t; t+1

>   B; fmn
 
t; t+1

>   F ;
with bmn
 
0

, fmn
 
0

, and fpm  t; t+1 ; q  t; t+1gt2[0;1) given, 8t with t 2 [0;1).
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First order conditions with respect to cmn
 
t

, bmn
 
t; t+1

, and fmn
 
t; t+1

are:
mn
 
t

= t
 
t

U 0
 
cmn
 
t
241 + tX
s=0
X
tjs
 s [mn (
s) + ^mn (
s)]

 
tjs

 
t

35 ; (2)
pm
 
t; t+1

=
mn
 
t; t+1
  mn  t; t+1 dVmn ((t;t+1);bmn (t;t+1))dbmn (t;t+1)
mn
 
t
 ; (3)
q
 
t; t+1

=
mn
 
t; t+1

mn
 
t
 ; (4)
where mn
 
t

, mn
 
t

, and ^mn
 
t

denote, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers on the
budget constraint (RP-BC), the international participation constraint (RP-IPC), and the
domestic participation constraint (RP-DPC) if t occurs.
A default-free equilibrium of the economy (as dened below) can thus be constructed,
given that sophisticated default prevention constraints are imposed on the level of atom-
istic agents.
Denition 1 A Trade Equilibrium is an allocation

cmn
 
t

; bmn
 
t; t+1

; fmn
 
t; t+1
	
t2[0;1)
and a price sequence

pm
 
t; t+1

; q
 
t; t+1
	
t2[0;1) such that each type solves its (RP)
given prices and initial bond holdings, while the resource feasibility,
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
cmn
 
t
  MX
m=1
NX
n=1
emn
 
t

;
13
M domestic asset market clearing conditions,
NX
n=1
bmn
 
t; t+1

= 0; 8m; t+1;
and one international asset market clearing condition,
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
fmn
 
t; t+1

= 0; 8t+1;
are satised 8t with t 2 [0;1).
Turning to equilibrium characteristics, the analysis begins by focusing on agents with
mn
 
t; t+1

> 0, particularly, their consumption path and the externality of their bor-
rowing decisions. A strictly positive multiplier  implies the corresponding (RP-IPC)
holds with equality, so that those private borrowers are participation constrained in the
international asset market at
 
t; t+1

and hence borrowing constrained at t in obtaining
international debt for payment next period in state t+1.
Lemma 2 At every future history that grows out of
 
t; t+1

, residents with mn
 
t; t+1

strictly greater than 0 consume the same amount after an international bond default as
by staying undefaulted,
cm;Dn (
r; r+1) = c
m
n (
r; r+1) ; 8r 2 [t;1) :
Proof. According to the second part of Lemma 10 in Appendix A, mn
 
t; t+1

> 0
implies that both

cm;Dn (
r; r+1)
	
r2[t;1) and fcmn (r; r+1)gr2[t;1)  fcmn
 
t
g
t2[0;1) solve
14
the strictly convex problem (RIA), thereby identical on and after
 
t; t+1

.
Lemma 3 For all histories, either all types in a country are internationally participation
constrained, i.e., mn (
t; t+1) > 0; 8n, or none.
Proof. 8m;  t; t+1, without loss of generality suppose m1  t; t+1 > 0 and thus,
using bond price formulas (A.2) and (A.3) from Appendix A, q
 
t; t+1

> pm
 
t; t+1

,
which the other way around implies mn
 
t; t+1

> 0; 8n for this price inequality applies
to every type in country m.
In an internationally unconstrained country, all residents are unconstrained for do-
mestic debt since the slackness of (RP-IPC) means (RP-DPC) is slack as well. Both
shadow prices mn
 
t; t+1

and ^mn
 
t; t+1

equal to 0. The MRS in this country is
therefore equalized across di¤erent types, and the international bond price is determined
by this MRS, which in turn equals to the countrys domestic bond price to rule out arbi-
trage possibilities. Oppositely, when a country is as a whole participation constrained in
the international asset market, the mutual MRS of its agents unconstrained for domestic
debt is higher than a host of heterogeneous MRSs of those constrained within borders.
Proposition 4 In the Trade Equilibrium, 8n;m;  t; t+1, the domestic bond price is
the maximum MRS in country m,
pm
 
t; t+1

= max
n=1;2;:::;N
(

U 0
 
cmn
 
t; t+1

U 0
 
cmn
 
t
   t+1jt) ;
15
and the international bond price is the maximum of all domestic bond prices,
q
 
t; t+1

= max
m=1;2;:::;M

pm
 
t; t+1
	
:
Proof. The rst part is proved by seeking a contradiction. The result is obvious
in participation unconstrained countries, so focus on a constrained country. It is given
that the international participation constraint (RP-IPC) binds for all residents in a con-
strained country. As can be seen in (A.4), a constrained countrys domestic bond price
pm
 
t; t+1

is determined by the MRS of residents unconstrained for domestic debt. Sup-
pose this price is not the maximum MRS. Given a higher MRS than pm
 
t; t+1

, those
domestically constrained residents with mn
 
t; t+1

> 0 will start to lend at pm
 
t; t+1

.
Since the RHS of (RP-IPC) grows faster than its LHS when bmn
 
t; t+1

increases,

1 + mn
 
t; t+1

U 0
 
cm;Dn
 
t; t+1

> U 0
 
cmn
 
t; t+1

;
the international participation constraint is violated and a default occurs; this contradicts
our original hypothesis that (RP-IPC) is satised. Therefore it must not be true that
pm
 
t; t+1

is not the maximum. The second part can be readily read o¤ from comparing
Eqs. (A.1) and (A.3).
The absence of legal enforcement on a debt between citizens lowers the continuation
value of (RIA), thereby relaxing the international participation constraint (RP-IPC). The
newly added domestic participation constraint (RP-DPC) is superuous due to the crucial
16
ingredient of this paper domestic default will never happen before an international
default. Put it another way, as a result of V mn
 
t; bmn
 
t

> Amn
 
t

; 8t, repayment
on domestic debt is secured as long as the mechanism prevents attempted international
default. International bond defaulters are confronted with more severe penalties, which
allows larger international capital inow than that a model with domestically complete
asset markets would predict.
In general, (RP-IPC) makes the problem (RP) non-convex, but the su¢ ciency of the
rst-order-condition approach to characterize a global maximum can be justied using
the same technique proposed by Jeske (2006). First, dene an alternative maximization
problem with the same objective function and a convex constraint set that is a superset
of the non-convex constraint set in the original non-convex problem. In particular, (RP-
IPC) is replaced by its necessary condition Fmn
 
t

> 0 according to Lemma 10. Then, it
can be shown a solution to the original problem is also a¤ordable and individually rational
in the alternative convex problem. It turns out that both problems have identical rst
order conditions together with transversality conditions; thus the same optimal solutions.
3 Welfare Analysis
Under the assumption of complete and perfect domestic asset markets, aggregate welfare
in the setting of private international borrowing can be elevated by centralized borrow-
ing (Jeske, 2006) or a less radical way of using a system of borrowing subsidies to mimic
the constrained optimum under centralization (Wright, 2006). The intuition behind this
17
remedy is that the planner internalizes a negative externality individual defaulter hold-
ing the belief that domestic bond price will stay unchanged after her default and hence
reduces post-default values. This paper argues that a central planner may sometimes do
worse than the market equilibrium under the assumption of pervasive default risk. This
is due to the fact that the planner can, by implicitly completing the markets domesti-
cally, provide a smoother identical consumption to all. As a result aggregate autarky
values are higher than that under market equilibrium thus discouraging international
debt ows. This negative impact dominates the positive impact of externality removal
when the aggregated post-default value in market equilibrium is smaller than autarky
utility in centralized borrowing. In a numerical example where endowment path is spec-
ied, this condition can be further materialized in terms of parameters on endowment
distributions.
Suppose a small open economy is taken over by a benevolent planner. The planner
trades international bonds and allocates consumption domestically, whereas residents
have no access to any asset market. The default risk on domestic debt is eliminated,
but the planner can still default on national debt overseas if autarky turns out better at
some history. Assume the type-specic welfare weights are given by 'n 2 R++ 8n; the
Planners Autarky (PA) value is:
V m
 
t
  max
fcmn (r)gr2[t;1)
NX
n=1
'n
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) ; (PA)
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subject to the resource constraint,
NX
n=1
emn (
r) >
NX
n=1
cmn (
r) ; (PA-BC)
8r with r 2 [t;1). Before a default, the Planners Problem (PP) is:
max
fcmn (t);fm(t)gt2[0;1)
NX
n=1
'n
1X
t=0
t
X
t

 
t

U
 
cmn
 
t

; (PP)
subject to the resource constraint,
NX
n=1
emn
 
t

+ fm
 
t

>
NX
n=1
cmn
 
t

+
X
t+1
q
 
t; t+1

fm
 
t; t+1

; (PP-BC)
the planners participation constraint in the international asset market,
NX
n=1
'mn
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U (cmn (r)) > V m
 
t

; (PP-IPC)
and the no-Ponzi game condition,
fm
 
t; t+1

>   F ;
with fm
 
0

and

q
 
t; t+1
	
t2[0;1) given, 8t with t 2 [0;1). The following proposi-
tion formalizes the possibility that centralization being a welfare-inferior scenario.
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Proposition 5 Exogenously given f'ngn=1;2;:::;N , let

cmn
 
t

; bmn
 
t; t+1

; fmn
 
t; t+1
	
t2[0;1)
solve (RP), and

cm;Pn
 
t

; fm
 
t; t+1
	
t2[0;1) solve (PP),
NX
n=1
'n
1X
t=0
t
X
t

 
rjtU  cmn  t > NX
n=1
'n
1X
t=0
t
X
t

 
t

U
 
cm;Pn
 
t

;
if the endowment structure satises
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU  cm;Pn  t > Amn  t ; 8n; t;
and there is a history
 
t; t+1

such that
NX
n=1
'nV
m
n
  
t; t+1

; bmn
 
t; t+1

< V m
 
t; t+1

:
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Numerical Example
The outcomes are illustrated through an instance. Consider a simple economy where there
are only two countries: 1 and 2. Each country is populated by a unit mass of residents
with static preference U (c) = log (c) and discount factor  2 (0; 1). Residents born at
t = 0 live forever in a discrete time context. One sort of non-storable consumption goods
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is traded every period according to risk sharing contracts signed before the realization
of endowment structure. A countrys beginning endowment could be high state 1 + y or
low state 1  y, and is contrary to the other country. Given this initial value, aggregate
endowment then alternates between high and low deterministically in either country. The
sum of two countriesendowment is however always 2, since they are mirror images of
one another by design. Residents are labeled as either type A, who face an idiosyncratic
shock in high state 1 + y + " and a negative shock in low state 1   y   " > 0, or type
B, who receive the opposite treatment: 1 + y   " in high and 1   y + " in low. It is
assumed that y, " 2 (0; 1) and y > ", capturing the notion that income uctuation across
countries is more volatile than variation within a country.5 Type Bs endowment path is
relatively smoother than type As in all cases.
Prior to period 0, the timeline of contracting is as follows. First, residents in the
same country enter into a domestic risk-sharing contract. Second, a coin ip determines
the type of half random residents in both countries. Then, domestic obligations will be
fullled under the assumption of perfect enforcement within borders or exposed to de-
fault risk if there exists a pervasive problem of commitment. However, a domestic default
means losing the opportunity of exchange across borders. Next, domestic citizens and for-
eigners agree on an international risk-sharing contract. After that, another independent
coin ip determines countriesinitial endowments. Eventually, agents decide whether to
deviate from the international agreement depending upon post-default utilities.
Suppose Country 1 starts o¤with high state. The entire Country 1 is thereby partic-
5y < "makes the limited commitment problem on domestic debt irrelevant since domestic risk sharing
will always be perfect irrespective of legal enforcement.
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ipation constrained in the international asset market at even numbered periods. Table
1a summarizes the endowment structure at even numbered periods, while Table 1b in-
cludes all odd numbered periods. Let z denote the consumption deviation in general.
The lifetime preference for residents in Country 1 is:
1X
t=0
t log
 
1 + ( 1)t z = 
1   log [(1 + z) +  log (1  z)] :
Rescale it to obtain
u1 (z) = log (1 + z) +  log (1  z) ;
and residents in Country 2 have
u2 (z) = log (1  z) +  log (1 + z) :
Note um (z) represents ex-post utility in the sense that host countrys initial endowment
has been revealed. For the purpose of welfare comparison, the corresponding ex-ante
utility is dened as
E [u (z)] =
1
2
u1 (z) +
1
2
u2 (z) :
Since E [u (z)] is strictly decreasing in z, smaller consumption deviation z signies more
international risk sharing and hence higher ex-ante welfare.
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Table 1: Endowment Structure
Measure Type n Country m
a) Even numbered periods
m = 1 m = 2
1
2
n = A 1 + y + " 1  y   "
1
2
n = B 1 + y   " 1  y + "
1
2
(A+B) 1 + y 1  y
b) Odd numbered periods
m = 1 m = 2
1
2
n = A 1  y   " 1 + y + "
1
2
n = B 1  y + " 1 + y   "
1
2
(A+B) 1  y 1 + y
4.1 Private Borrowing with Domestic Enforcement
Because debt between two domestic residents is perfectly enforced, di¤erent types in the
same country consume an identical amount cm (t) each period.
c1 (2k) = 1 + xJ ; c1 (2k + 1) = 1  xJ ;
c2 (2k) = 1  xJ ; c2 (2k + 1) = 1 + xJ ;
where 2k represents even numbered periods and 2k + 1 odd numbered periods with
k 2 N, the set of non-negative integers. Discounted by Arrow-Debreu type of prices, the
present value of all future payments from the participation constrained country to the
unconstrained must equal to zero,
xJ   y + q  y   xJ
1  pq = 0; (5)
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where q and p respectively denote the one-period domestic bond price in the country
that is participation unconstrained and constrained in the international asset market
next period.6 In other words, q can be found for residents who consume 1+xJ at current
period and 1  xJ at next period,
q   1 + x
J
1  xJ : (6)
Residents who consume 1 xJ at current period and 1+xJ at next period face domestic
bond price,
p   1  x
J
1 + xJ
:
Thus, the international bond price q (t) = q; 8t, and the domestic bond price pm (t) jumps
between p and q over time.
p1 (t) =
8>><>>:
p at t = 2k;
q at t = 2k + 1:
(7)
p2 (t) =
8>><>>:
q at t = 2k;
p at t = 2k + 1:
There are two solutions to Eq. (5). The rst is autarky, or xJ = y, while the second
requires q = 1, which further implies xJ = 1 
1+
using Eq. (6). Let xJ be the benchmark
level of consumption deviation. It can be reduced by two competing setups: centralization
6See the derivation in Appendix A.
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in Section 4.2 and pervasive risk in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the ranking of these
two improvements.
4.2 Centralized Borrowing
In a centralized economy, government prohibits private borrowing. Instead, it borrows
in the international asset market on behalf of its residents and apportions total resources
equally. One can aggregate each country into a representative agent with the following
consumption pattern.
c1 (2k) = 1 + xc; c1 (2k + 1) = 1  xc;
c2 (2k) = 1  xc; c2 (2k + 1) = 1 + xc;
where xc is the smallest deviation satisfying Country 1s international participation con-
straint in an even numbered period.
xc = min
z>0
fz : log (1 + z) +  log (1  z)  log (1 + y) +  log (1  y)g :
To support some international risk sharing, the aggregate endowment y must satisfy two
restrictions given an exogenous discount factor . The rst restriction is
  log (1 + y)
log (1  y) > ; (8)
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otherwise consumption is fully smoothed, i.e., xc = 0; and the second restriction is
y >
1  
1 + 
; (9)
otherwise autarky is preferred, i.e., xc = y. Once these two constraints are met, xc < 1 
1+
can be observed in Figure 1. Known xJ = 1 
1+
or y, the arrangement of centralized
borrowing is welfare superior than Jeskes decentralized setup.
E [u (xc)] > E

u
 
xJ

:
4.3 Private Borrowing under Pervasive Default Risk
When there exists no legal enforcement on domestic contract, the optimal consumption
cmn (t) varies between types in addition to across countries. By symmetry,
c1A (2k) = 1 + x+ "
p; c1A (2k + 1) = 1  x  "p;
c1B (2k) = 1 + x  "p; c1B (2k + 1) = 1  x+ "p;
c2A (2k) = 1  x  "p; c2A (2k + 1) = 1 + x+ "p;
c2B (2k) = 1  x+ "p; c2B (2k + 1) = 1 + x  "p;
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Allocation and Ex-Post Utilities in The Numerical Example
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Notes: This gure illustrates the optimal consumption deviations in Country 1 with high initial
endowment at even periods. The curve is symmetric in shape around the maximum. A rep-
resentative resident in Jeskes setup and a centralized arrangement achieves, respectively, the
ex-post utility level of u1
 
xJ

and u1 (xc). In the setup of pervasive risk of default, type As
utility level is u1A (x+ "
p), while type Bs utility level is denoted as u1B (x  "p). The values of
parameters used in this gure are as follows. The aggregate component of income uctuation is
characterized by y = 0:13. The idiosyncratic component of income uctuation is characterized
by " = 0:01. The discount factor  = 0:85 satises both restrictions (8) and (9) given the value
of y. Some international risk sharing can be supported.
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where " > "p > 0 indicates imperfect domestic risk sharing.7 Type B is domestically
borrowing constrained when its host country is as a whole internationally participa-
tion constrained, whereas in participation unconstrained country type A is domestically
borrowing constrained. x and "p are jointly determined by the binding international
participation constraints for both types,
8>><>>:
(x+"p) y+q[y (x+"p)]
1 pq = 0 for type A;
(x "p) y+q[y (x "p)]
1 pq = 0 for type B,
(10)
and they have to satisfy the domestic participation constraints for type B:
8>><>>:
log (1 + x  "p) +  log (1  x+ "p)  log (1 + y   ") +  log (1  y + ") ;
log (1  x+ "p) +  log (1 + x  "p)  log (1  y + ") +  log (1 + y   ") :
The international bond price always equals to the highest MRS in the world,
q (t) = q   1 + x+ "
p
1  x  "p ; (11)
and the domestic bond price in a next-period participation constrained country equates
to the highest MRS within a country,
p   1  x+ "
p
1 + x  "p :
7Jeskes setup is then a special case of pervasive risk of default when one sets "p = 0: To make the
problem of limited commitment within a country interesting, assume "p to be strictly positive throughout
this section.
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The pattern of domestic bond price pm (t) can be dened similarly as in Eq. (7). In
contrast to the formal model, current period MRSs are not equalized within a country
that is unconstrained next period for continuing participation in the international asset
market. Specically, Country 1s type A has a larger MRS than type B at even periods.
The reason this occurs is consumption ips back and forth only every two periods. Solving
Eq. (10) gives one unique solution, q = 1, which further implies x + "p = 1 
1+
for type
A using Eq. (11). Domestic borrowing imperfections lead to a consumption deviation
x   "p < 1 
1+
for type B. As a result, the pervasive risk of default improves the welfare
level in Jeskes decentralized setup as well.
1
2
E [u (x+ "p)] +
1
2
E [u (x  "p)] > E u  xJ :
4.4 A Comparison of Welfare Improvement
Both centralized borrowing and pervasive risk of default can strictly increase welfare in
Jeskes benchmark setup, the question then becomes which one provides a better im-
provement. The answer depends upon the distance between two endowment distribution
parameters: cross-country aggregate deviation y and within-country cross-sectional shock
". When y is relatively larger than ", centralization results in a greater increment. On
the other hand, if " lies within a close neighborhood of y, pervasiveness does a better
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job.8
1
2
E [u (x+ "p)] +
1
2
E [u (x  "p)]
8>><>>:
6 E [u (xc)] if y   " >  ;
> E [u (xc)] if y   " <  ;
where the cuto¤  < 1 
1+
is implicitly dened by
1
2
E

u

1  
1 + 

+
1
2
E [u ( )] = E [u (xc)] :
However, aggregate income uctuation that is either highly volatile or fairly smooth will
compromise the benets of pervasive risk of default. At one extreme is relaxing restriction
(8) and therefore a complete international risk sharing, which can never be an equilibrium
outcome in a private debt environment, is attained by the centralized arrangement. At
the other end would be relaxing restriction (9), where both centralized arrangement and
Jeskes setup lead to autarky with perfect domestic risk sharing, xc = xJ = y, whereas
pervasive risk of default produces the worst-case scenario resident level autarky, x = y
and "p = ".
5 Conclusion
This paper builds upon Jeskes (2006) private international borrowing setup with het-
erogeneous agents and complete capital markets in a default-free equilibrium, except
for relaxing his assumption of perfect enforcement on domestic debt. To handle this I
assume, with an element of realism, that domestic bankruptcy debars agents from ac-
8See Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Ex-Ante Utilities and Welfare Comparison in The Numerical Example
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Notes: This gure compares at ex-ante the aggregate welfare levels for Jeskes setup,
E

u
 
xJ

, and a centralized arrangement, E [u (xc)], with the type-weighted welfare level un-
der the assumption of pervasive risk of default, 1
2
E [u (x+ "p)] +1
2
E [u (x+ "p)]. The values
of parameters used in this gure are as follows. The aggregate component of income uctuation
y = 0:10 and hence xc= 0:06. The idiosyncratic component of income uctuation " increases
from 0 to y. The discount factor  = 0:85. The cuto¤  = 0:028.
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cessing international markets as well, but not vice versa. Two results are obtained from
the pervasive absence of formal enforcement of debt contracts. First, when a country is
constrained in obtaining international debt, the MRS of its agents unconstrained for do-
mestic debt is higher than those constrained for debt consistent with the standard result
in the credit constraints literature and therefore the option to default on foreign debt
is less attractive than that an otherwise complete asset markets model would provide. It
turns out that a countrys domestic interest rate is determined by the reciprocal of the
highest MRS within the country and the international interest rate equals to the lowest
domestic interest rate to induce repayment. The second relates to centralized borrowing.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the private international debt framework can outper-
form a centralized arrangement in terms of social welfare under certain circumstances.
The reason this could happen is because of the central planners ability to provide higher
aggregate autarky values that will potentially discourage international capital inows.
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Part III
Contracting Institutions, Outside
Options, and Private Sector
External Debt
6 Introduction
An emerging markets external liabilities have been shown to increase with the coun-
trys institutional quality, or particularly, the quality of contracting institutions aimed
at enforcing a contract between host countrys government or residents and foreign in-
vestors [Lane, 2004; and Martinez-Vazquez and Mina, 2006, in the context of private and
public debt stocks in total; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008, in the context
of private equity ows].9 After controlling for contract enforcement involving foreign-
ers, research employing rm-deal-level data nds that the strength of enabling contracts
between citizens10 appears to have a mixed impact on the size of private debt owed over-
seas. Estys [2004] work shows that foreign banks provide a greater share of their total
9This research body measures legal enforcement using risk indexes from International Country Risk
Guide, which focus on a countrys institutional impact on foreign business.
10Strong internal contract enforcement results in the ease of obtaining private credit inside borders,
which in turn can be reected in a number of measurable indicators, e.g., powerful domestic creditor
protection, sound mechanism of facilitating domestic loans, advanced domestic nancial markets, and
etc.
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funds in countries with stronger creditor rights and less-developed nancial systems. Bae
and Goyal [2009] state that stronger legal rights of domestic creditors against defaulting
debtors do not seem to matter for the size of foreign bank loans (the relationship is nega-
tive and statistically insignicant). I consider this ambiguous result to be a combination
of two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, e¤ective protection of domestic creditors sig-
nies favorable institutional quality in general which facilitates international borrowing
(the potential overlap between international and domestic contract enforcement), but on
the other hand, it forces foreign lenders to tighten debt constraint because of the presence
of alternative funding channels after an international default hence hinders international
borrowing (a distinguishing feature of domestic contract enforcement). One might fear
that the latter e¤ect could also be due to substitution e¤ect, i.e., private entities have less
incentive to borrow internationally when local resources can easily satisfy their nancial
needs. I argue the role of substitution is small in developing countries, where domestic
funding cannot dominate foreign loan in terms of cost and accessibility. Weak contracting
and unimproved nancial institutions in emerging markets substantially increase the cost
of internal nancing [Fabbri and Padula, 2004, in the context of allocation of credit to
private household; Cole and Ariss, 2010, in the context of private bank lending; Martinez,
2010, in which lend spread rises in countries that most e¤orts are expended in nancial
development even if institution improves]. Moreover, private equity rms are willing to
invest in countries where contract enforcement was weaker for a better rate of return
[Taussig, 2011] or for diversication purpose [Bekaert and Urias, 1996].
In this paper, I test whether a countrys strength of enforcing domestic debt contract
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could exert a negative inuence on its private sectors ability to borrow in the interna-
tional asset market. This hypothesis is based on the notion that we have successfully
distinguished and controlled for the positive e¤ects of both international contract en-
forcement and the broad quality of institutions in the data. This causal relationship I
propose is built on the theoretical model presented in Chapter 1. To see exactly how
it works, consider the extreme case in which there is no enforcement on a private debt
contract between two residents. Assume domestic residents have access to international
asset market, and they are contemplating a default. Although the punishment was being
prohibited from the international market forever, an atomistic defaulter believes she can
still re-enter the market through borrowing from other non-defaulted residents as inter-
mediaries. However, an inner-environment without contract enforcement will tie these
potential defaulters hands with very tight credit constraints after they return to the
domestic asset market. Hence post-default utility is lower and default leads to a less
attractive outside option than in an otherwise perfect domestic market. From this it
follows that foreign lenders are able to raise the credit ceiling imposed on private debtors
in the home country.
I only consider developing and emerging market countries. In doing this, the ques-
tion that I am asking is, conditional on a country having relatively weaker institutions
and its residentscredit constraint binding, how do di¤erences in the contracting sys-
tem without foreign party involvement a¤ect the volume of international debt in private
sectors. I di¤erentiate between private (corporations and households) and public (gov-
ernment and monetary authorities) or publicly backed debt, since the theoretic story is
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more reasonable for atomistic corporations. Many authors argue that debt instruments
have intrinsic public characteristics, thereby the identity of the borrower reveals little
information [Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008, excluding debt from private
capital ows; Lane, 2004, treating private debt as public debt]. In a robustness test using
public debt instead of private debt as dependent variable, I show the identity does indeed
make a di¤erence. Word Banks external debt stocks, private nonguaranteedserves as
the variable to pick up the amount that private rms borrow overseas while government
assume no responsibility for repayment. The amount that government borrows to re-lend
domestically to private rms and assures repayment is absorbed by external debt stocks,
publicly guaranteed private. In this paper, I take the same approach as Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti [2001a,b] by focusing on the fundamental, slow-moving, cross-country variations
and, more importantly, working with stocks, rather than ows. Fundamental variations
draw attention because institutional quality rarely changes overtime. Therefore, this
analysis is based on cross-country regressions of time-series means from 2004-2008. The
reasons of working with stocks are twofold. One, the design of credit constraint depends
upon the level of stocks. Two, empirical studies of the determinants of external debt
typically rely on cross-sectional data on liability stocks at the country level.
The conceptually challenging part in this empirical study is to disentangle contract
enforcement against foreigners and citizens, as well as the dual implications by strong
contract enforcement between citizens: quality internal legal system in a broad sense and
convenient domestic fund raising. There is potentially much overlap between these three
aspects. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001] suggest there is a cluster of institu-
36
tions. Acemoglu and Johnson [2005] attempt to unbundle property rights, which provide
protect against expropriation by the government, and contract enforcement, which exe-
cutes private contracts. In contrast, this paper does not distinguish between the forms
of institutions; instead it makes a distinction between legal entitys nationalities. For
instance, a credible legal system implies strong enforcement on both international and
domestic debt contracts; and the processes of enforcing international and domestic con-
tract are very likely to share the same objective provisions. Nevertheless, there are also
important di¤erences. First of all, high judicial quality in broad terms does not guarantee
full recovery of domestic loans even if the debtor is able to pay. Second, international and
domestic debt enforcement may be uncorrelated due to subjective judgment and discrim-
ination against creditorsnationality. Evidence reveals that there exists discrimination
against either foreign or domestic creditors by legal authorities [Esty, 2004, in the con-
text of private sectors in default situations; Erce and Díaz-Cassou, 2010, in the context
of sovereign debt restructurings]. Also in international trade disputes, foreign creditors
may receive unfair treatment [Finger, 1992; Rajan and Lee, 2007]. The question then
becomes nding valid and distinct proxies for each set of institutions to identify their
respective impacts. For contract enforcement directed at foreigners, I use the simple
average of two risk indicators from International Country Risk Guides (ICRG hereafter)
IRIS-3 index: repudiation of contract and expropriation of private investment. Both
indicators explicitly deal with claims made by foreign nationals. I validate the result by
investment prole ratings from ICRGs political risk index, which measures viability of
foreign contracts and the e¢ ciency of collecting payo¤ from foreign investments. The
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measures of the general judicial quality are taken from three di¤erent sources: the legal
enforcement of contracts from Economic Freedom of the World (EFW hereafter); the
rule of lawfrom Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI hereafter); and the property
rightsindex from the Heritage Foundation (HF hereafter). Among them, EFWs com-
ponent index is used as my primary measure since it evolved out of a case study where
all parties are domestic entities and the dispute is over commercial sales. For the ease
of domestic nancing caused by strong domestic contract enforcement, the ideal proxy
would measure the costs of enforcing private loan contracts in which both parties are or-
dinary domestic bodies. Three di¤erent measures originating from World Banks Doing
Business Project (WBDB hereafter) come close to such an ideal measure. The rst and
primary measure is the simple average of the timeand logarithm of costfor creditors
to recover their credit, and the second is the recovery raterecouped by creditors, both
from WBDBs closing a business methodology. The third is the strength of legal rights
index from WBDBs getting credit methodology. All three measures correspond to the
costs of enforcing a straightforward contract in which all the parties are local entities or
citizens; no foreign parties are involved. In an attempt to reduce potential endogeneity
bias, I follow the strategy of multiple instrumental variables suggested by Acemoglu and
Johnson [2005]. Domestic credit to private sector is the fourth proxy I employed to con-
rm the negative relationship between domestic nancial development and international
borrowing.
Consistent with the related literature, I nd at a macro level that the key determi-
nants of countriesexternal debt stocks (especially the amount owed by private sectors)
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include quality of contracting institutions, size of economic activity, reliance on trades,
the availability of natural resources and, to a lesser extent, educational attainment, and
private sector performance. Unlike conventional studies, I break up contracting institu-
tions into three kinds and devote extensive attention to the role of contract enforcement
on facilitating domestic credit. Holding other institutional factors and a host of deter-
minants constant, worse inner contracting institutions relax credit constraints and allow
private sectors to accumulate more outer debts. This main result is conrmed by several
robustness exercises, where I show robustness to changes in the sample, measures, the
set of control variables, and estimation techniques.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7 reports the estimating equa-
tion and presents the empirical strategy. Section 8 introduces data sources, explaining
the selection and construction of measures for contracting institutions. Section 9 de-
scribes data, examines preliminary relationships, and reports the main results. Section
10 documents robustness tests and tackles the issue of endogeneity. Section 11 concludes,
followed by Appendix B containing a list of countries in the sample.
7 Specication and Strategies
I test whether private debtors in a country, where internal credit is di¢ cult to obtain
due to poor e¢ ciency of contract enforcement between citizens, are able to accumulate
relatively more long-term external obligations that are not guaranteed for repayment by
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a public entity. The following equation is estimated:
fm = + 1IntlEnfm + 2Qm + 3DomEnfm +X + "m; (12)
where fm denotes the nonguaranteed external debt stocks owed by private sectors in
country m to all creditors outside the country such as foreign commercial banks, other
governments, international nancial institutions; IntlEnfm is a proxy for the quality
of legal enforcement on a debt contract between a domestic resident and a foreigner,
whereas Qm and DomEnfm measure, respectively, two contradictory e¤ects of the en-
forcement intensity on a debt contract between two domestic residents in country m;
Qm stands for the broadly perceived judicial quality and DomEnfm stands for the ease
of obtaining private credit inside boarders; X is a vector of alternative determinants
of private debt recognized in the literature. Specically, I include in X the size of the
economy GDP (total gross domestic product); material reliance on the rest of the world
NetIM (net imports of goods and services); the relative importance of natural resources
NR (net exports of agricultural raw materials, fuels, ores, and metals); human capital
H (percentage of population over 25 that completed secondary schooling); and private
sector wealth Asset (gross external assets held by a countrys residents against nonres-
idents). All level variables are in U.S. billions of dollars at current (i.e., 2011) prices.
The baseline sample, for which all data on the above-mentioned variables are available,
consists of 60-73 countries depending on the specication over the period 2004-2008. I
test robustness in Section 5 for alternative sample sizes (a larger sample with more data
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on measures of Qm available and a smaller sample allowing only strictly positive fm);
di¤erent forms of dependent variable (private debt in per-capita form and public debt
stocks); the introduction of additional determinant factors such as the degree of govern-
ment control on capital ows CC (popular index of capital account openness), a dummy
OECD for member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD hereafter), monetary policy and economic stability Inflation (annual
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods
and services), and domestic stock market development MktCap (market capitalization
of listed companies in U.S. billions of dollars at current prices); alternative measures for
the quality of each contracting institutions; and panel-data estimating strategies (pooled
OLS, xed-e¤ects, and random-e¤ects model).
The estimation here is conceptually distinct from studies that show there is a positive
relationship between various compositions of external liabilities in an emerging mar-
ket and the quality of its institutions. This strand of research has shown that higher
institutional quality tilt countriesliability structures toward longer maturity [Martinez-
Vazquez and Mina, 2006], higher shares of equity [Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Faria and
Mauro, 2009], wider spread [Bae and Goyal, 2009], as well as higher leverage and lower
Weighted Average Cost of Capital [Arellano, Bai, and Zhang, 2007; Okere, Tamule, and
Maloney, 2010]. Unlike them, in my estimating equation, the dependent variable only
considers the level of debt stocks (total value of the debt at a point in time) owed by
private (corporations or private households) nonguaranteed (repayment not secured by
government) debtors in a developing country.
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In equation (12), when a set of explanatory variablesX has been controlled for, OLS
regressions show the rest part of external debt stocks are explained by three sets of inter-
active institutions. Using valid proxies for each institution, the theory suggests we expect
a negative coe¢ cient 3: corporations and households in countries with a worse post-
default option borrow more outside the borders. If two countries have similar internal
nancing structure, but private sectors in the country that establishes quality legislative
system and assures repatriation of foreign earnings borrows relatively more, then 1 and
2 will be positive. However, the empirical challenge that such an investigation has to
overcome is endogeneity. Both omitted variable and simultaneity can cause the loop of
causality between debt and institution variables.
Firstly, the model is specied as a cross-section: 2004-2008 averages of variables over
times. Thereby I follow related literature [Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001a,b; Klein and
Olivei, 2008; Faria and Mauro, 2009; Martinez, 2010] in utilizing a "between" estimator
from panel-data analysis. The problem with cross sectional data is that there may be
determinants of external debt that are omitted from the estimation equation. One nat-
ural response is adopting xed-e¤ects model and time-varying measures of institutional
quality to control for unobservable country heterogeneity using country e¤ects, but this
is problematic for the following reasons. (I) Yearly data on long-term external debt out-
standing are intertwined given di¤erent inception and maturity dates;11 (II) measures of
institutional quality are not available over a long time period, e.g., WBDB data started
11Pooling data causes endogeneity once again due to autocorrelated errors. Although this might be
corrected by specifying how errors are correlated e.g., an AR1 process, you add one more layer of possible
modeling errors.
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in 2004,12 and they vary considerably across countries but rarely changing over time
within countries;13 (III) the panel approach, especially xed-e¤ects, only looks at within
country e¤ects hence digresses from the aim of this paper. Because of all these, I choose
between-e¤ects among other estimators, and carefully control for a host of alternative de-
terminants suggested by previous literature. Nevertheless, I report the results of pooled
OLS, xed-e¤ects, and random-e¤ects in Section 5.
Second, OLS correlations do not account for reverse causality that may run from debt
stocks to various aspects of institutions. That is, countries that borrow more have higher
growth and hence better institutions. Although it has been shown that capital account
liberalization, dened as easing restrictions on capital ows across a countrys borders,
can promote nancial deepening [Klein and Olivei, 2008] and a¤ect the development of
institutional quality [Klein, 2005], and eventually result in greater economic growth. Less
well studied is whether debt can also a¤ect contract enforcement. One of the only sources
of evidence on this comes from Ahlquist and Prakash [2009], where multinational cor-
porations have incentives to inuence contract enforcement costs in host countries, and
equally, host governments are more likely to respond to multinationalswishes when they
are more dependent on foreign capital markets. The same logic also applies to foreign
lenders. To isolate variation in all degrees of legal enforcement across country that are
12Moreover, countries may experience political and economic transitions over a longer time period
(transitional countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, and etc. are included in the sample), resulting in
jumps of institutional quality which have to be accounted for. But this feature is not relevant for my
analysis.
13Even if there are changes at all, it is very likely to be gradual improving and path-dependent. E.g.,
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) nd that creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary
to the hypothesis that legal rules across the world are converging.
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una¤ected by private debt holdings, I instrument my measures of contract enforcement
using a multiple instrumental variables strategy in a similar way as Acemoglu and John-
son [2005]. The instruments used include settlersmortality [Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005; Ranjan and Lee, 2007; Faria and Mauro, 2009], population density in the 1500s
[Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005], legal origin [Nunn, 2007; Amin and Ranjan, 2008], and
ethnolinguistic fractionalization [Mauro, 1995; Faria and Mauro, 2009].
8 Data Sources
8.1 Dependent Variable and Control Variables
Data on the dependent variable external debt stocks, private nonguaranteed (PNG)
(DOD, current US$) are taken from the World Banks World Development Indicators
(WBWDI hereafter) with a coverage of 127 countries. In the World Bank classica-
tion, external debt stocks comprise long-term (consisting of private nonguaranteed and
public and publicly guaranteed by the identity of the borrower), short-term, and use of
International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter) credit. I use alternative data on private
sector debt for seven additional countries including Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Israel, Jordan, Poland, and Slovak Republic to complement World Banks dataset. As
a result, the full sample of debt data contains 134 countries. The Institute of Interna-
tional Finance (IIF hereafter) Economic Databases act as this complementary source,
where external debts are divided according to the borrowers identity into private sector,
public sector, and deposit money banksdebt. IIF does not further distinguish between
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long-term and short-term under this classication, but I argue short-term debt accounts
for a small proportion of total external debt stocks, the average share is around 14%.
The debt data in the full sample are from 2004-2009 with no gap, but the beginning and
ending year may vary across countries. The unit of debt data is billions of U.S. dollars
at current prices. The sample mostly consists of developing and emerging market coun-
tries, though there are eight of them (Chile14, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mexico,
Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey) who hold the membership of OECD.15
Data on GDP, GDP per capita, trade volume, natural resources, equity market, and
ination are all from WBWDI. For some countries GDP and trade data are missing for
the year of 2009, I use estimates from the IMFs World Economic Outlook and Central
Intelligence Agencys World Factbook to ll in the blanks. Data on external assets
of domestic private sectors, referring to claims and transactions between a countrys
residents and nonresidents, were assembled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2001a,b and
2006] in their 2009 version of External Wealth of Nations Mark II dataset. The human
capital variable is measured as the percentage of total population over 25 that have
completed secondary schooling in the year of 2000,16 as reported by Barro and Lee [2001].
The index measuring a countrys degree of capital control is drawn from two places both
updated to 2008: the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness assembled by Chinn
14Chile being the only OECD member which is also a member in the organization of developing
countries, the Group of 77.
15Countries that join the OECD improve their credibility as their economic policy is restricted and
monitored by other member states. Most of them are high-income economies with a high Human
Development Index (HDI) and are regarded as developed countries.
16Human capital only have information available for, at best, several discontinuous years (1990, 1995,
and 2000). I use the data for the most recent available year to proxy for my targeted time period
2004-2009.
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and Ito [2008], and Fraser Institutes international capital market controlscomponent
index published in 2010 EFW Annual Report.
8.2 Measures of Institutional Quality
For each set of contracting institutions, I rely on one primary measure that most closely
t the description of a specic institution, and validate the result with several alternative
measures.
International Contract Enforcement
The measure of international contract enforcement IntlEnf is taken from two les:
the academic version of ICRG known as IRIS-3 and ICRGs political risk index. The rst
one is my primary indicator, and I take advantage of the second one in the robustness
regression. IRIS-3 contains annual values for six indicators of the quality of governance
over the period 1982-1997, constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center at the
University of Maryland, based on monthly ICRG data provided by the Political Risk
Services group. The six indicators are corruption in government, rule of law (law and
order tradition), bureaucratic quality, ethnic tensions, repudiation of contracts by gov-
ernment, risk of expropriation. I am only interested in the last two indicators because
they closely relate to foreign participation by denition. Risk of repudiation addresses
the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors and consultants face the risk of a mod-
ication in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement, or scaling down,
due to an income drop, budget cutbacks, and indigenization priorities. Lower scores
signify a greater likelihood that a country will modify or repudiate a contract with a
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foreign business.Similarly, risk of expropriation of private investment evaluates the risk
outright conscation and forced nationalizationof property. Lower ratings are given
to countries where expropriation of private foreign investment is a likely event.Both
indicators are scales ranging from zero to 10, with higher values indicating better ratings,
i.e., less risk. IntlEnf_R&E takes the value of the simple average of these two variables.
Since this is a relatively "old" dataset, I focus on a countrys average level during the
years 1984-1997 rather than the measured level in 1997, the last year of coverage, in order
to minimize random variations and account for history dependence. In my full sample
of 134 countries, ICRGs IRIS-3 has data for 84 of them. ICRGs political risk index is
based on poll of expertsopinions and ratings of 12 political risk indicators available dur-
ing the time span of 1984-2007. The indicators are government stability, socioeconomic
conditions, investment prole, internal conict, external conict, corruption, military in
politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and
bureaucracy quality. This paper focuses on investment prole (IntlEnf_IP ) since this
indicator represents the risk of foreign investment. The risk rating of investment prole
assigned equals to the sum of three subcomponents: contract viability, prots repatri-
ation, and payment delays, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum
score of zero point. Higher score equates lower risk. The coverage of investment prole
data coincides with only part of the time period I study. Whenever investment prole
appears in a robustness check regression, all other variables are limited to the time span
of 2004-2007.
General Judicial Quality
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As my main measure of average judicial quality Q, I use the component index legal
enforcement of contracts(Q_ENF ) from Fraser Institutes EFW dataset complied by
Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson [2010], which in turn is based on estimates from WBDBs
enforcing contracts methodology for the time and money required to resolve a commercial
sale dispute, rst introduced by Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [2003].
The time and money measurements are built by following the step-by-step evolution of
a dispute case study, where raw data are collected through the codes of civil procedure
and other court regulations as well as surveys completed by local litigation lawyers and
by judges. The value of the claim is assumed to equal 200% of the economys per-
capita income where the plainti¤ has complied with the contract and judicial judgment is
rendered in his favor. Zero-to-10 ratings were constructed for (I) the time cost (measured
in number of calendar days required from the moment the lawsuit is led until payment)
and (II) the monetary cost of the case (measured as a percentage of the claim). These
two ratings were then averaged to arrive at the nal rating for the legal enforcement of
contracts. The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings was: Vmax Vi
Vmax Vmin multiplied
by 10. Vi represents the time or money cost value. The values for Vmax and Vmin were
set at 725 days and 82.3% (1.5 standard deviations above average) and 62 days (1.5
standard deviations below average) and 0%, respectively. Countries with values outside
of the Vmax and Vmin range received ratings of either zero or 10 accordingly. Gwartney et
al.s dataset is in every ve years from 1970 and becomes annual after 2000 with most
recent update in 2008. And 101 countries in the full sample have this data. In the
section of robustness test, values for some of the missing countries and the year 2009
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are constructed in the same way as described above, based on recently released time
and money cost data from WBDBs enforcing contracts methodology. I have chosen
Gwatney et al.s variables as my baseline measure because the dispute concerns a lawful
transaction between a seller and a buyer, which is most likely to reect the general
judicial quality but least likely to a¤ect the ease of obtaining a domestic loan. There
is one extra cost measure from WBDBs enforcing contracts methodology the number
of procedures (Q_PROC).17 Similar results are obtained by using Q_PROC as the
proxy of general judicial system. I also test the sensitivity of my results to the use of
alternative measures from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2010] and the HF. Kaufman
et al. provide indexes for six dimensions of governance starting from 1996 to 2009:
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government
e¤ectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The six governance
indicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better governance outcomes. I rely on the rule of law(Q_ROL) in
their WGI dataset. This component captures perceptions of the extent to which agents
have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence. The HF makes an index of property rights (Q_HF ) available,
and I utilize this index for the year of 2011 to take the place of 2004-2009 values. The
property rights index is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private
17The number of procedures traces the chronology of a commercial dispute before the relevant court.
A procedure is dened as any interaction, required by law or commonly used in practice, between the
parties or between them and the judge or court o¢ cer. This includes steps to le and serve the case,
steps for trial and judgment and steps necessary to enforce the judgment.
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property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the
degree to which a countrys laws protect private property rights and the degree to which
its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property
will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce
contracts. This index runs from zero to 100. The more certain the legal protection of
property, the higher a countrys score; similarly, the greater the chances of government
expropriation of property, the lower a countrys score.
Domestic Contract Enforcement
The data to proxy for domestic credit facility DomEnf is constructed from several
measures capturing di¤erent aspects of domestic debt contract enforcement, most of
which are likely to be highly correlated with the easiness of obtaining private credit
domestically. There are four measures from three di¤erent sources under the World Bank
Group: WBDBs closing a business, WBDBs getting credit, and WBWDIs domestic
credit to private sector.
The data on closing a business methodology are derived from survey responses by
local insolvency practitioners and veried through a study of laws and regulations as well
as public information on bankruptcy systems. This study contains three subcomponents
of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities: time for creditors to recover their
credit in calendar years, the cost of the proceedings as a percentage of the value of
the debtors estate, and the recovery rate as cents on the dollar recouped by creditors
through reorganization, liquidation, or debt enforcement (foreclosure) proceedings. My
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rst measure of domestic contract enforcement is derived from a simple average between
time and logarithm of cost (DomEnf_T&C), in a way that higher value implies easier
credit (11 years minus actual years passed and 6 minus logarithm of cost spent). Recover
rate (DomEnf_REC) serves as the second measure. Its calculation takes into account
not only time and cost but also the debt seniority and outcome of bankruptcy: whether
the business emerges from the proceedings as a going concern or the assets are sold
piecemeal. In specic,
DomEnf_REC  100GC + 70 (1 GC)  12 (P   1)  100 c
(1 + r)
;
where dummy variable GC equals to 1 if the rm continues operating as a going concern,
and to 0 if it is liquidated; integer P is the payment priority with 1 representing the rst
lien claim, 2 second lien and so on; c is the costs of bankruptcy proceedings;  is the
processing time it takes to get paid; and r is the prevailing discount rate. Higher ex-post
recovery rate represents easier private credit ex ante. Measures taken from closing a
business methodology satisfy almost all criteria of becoming an ideal proxy for the ease
of getting a domestic loan due to contracting institutions. This qualication is revealed
by several assumptions about the business, the case, and the parties.
Assumption about the business
The business: Is a limited liability company. Operates in the economys
largest business city. Is 100% domestically owned, with the founder, who is
also the chairman of the supervisory board, owning 51% (no other shareholder
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holds more than 5% of shares). Has downtown real estate, where it runs a
hotel, as its major asset. The hotel is valued at 100 times income per capita
or $200,000, whichever is larger. Has a professional general manager. Has 201
employees and 50 suppliers, each of which is owed money for the last delivery.
Has a 10-year loan agreement with a domestic bank secured by a universal
business charge (e.g., a oating charge) in economies where such collateral
is recognized or by the hotel property. If the laws of the economy do not
specically provide for a universal business charge but contracts commonly
use some other provision to that e¤ect, this provision is specied in the loan
agreement. Has observed the payment schedule and all other conditions of
the loan up to now. Has a mortgage, with the value of the mortgage principal
being exactly equal to the market value of the hotel.
Assumption about the case
The business is experiencing liquidity problems. The companys loss in
2009 reduced its net worth to a negative gure. It is January 1, 2010. There is
no cash to pay the bank interest or principal in full, due the next day, January
2. The business will therefore default on its loan. Management believes that
losses will be incurred in 2010 and 2011 as well. The amount outstanding
under the loan agreement is exactly equal to the market value of the hotel
business and represents 74% of the companys total debt. The other 26% of
its debt is held by unsecured creditors (suppliers, employees, tax authorities).
The company has too many creditors to negotiate an informal out-of-court
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workout. The following options are available: a judicial procedure aimed at
the rehabilitation or reorganization of the company to permit its continued
operation; a judicial procedure aimed at the liquidation or winding-up of
the company; or a debt enforcement or foreclosure procedure against the
company, enforced either in court (or through another government authority)
or out of court (e.g., by appointing a receiver).
Assumption about the parties
The bank wants to recover as much as possible of its loan, as quickly and
cheaply as possible. The unsecured creditors will do everything permitted
under the applicable laws to avoid a piecemeal sale of the assets. The major-
ity shareholder wants to keep the company operating and under its control.
Management wants to keep the company operating and preserve their jobs.
All the parties are local entities or citizens; no foreign parties are involved.
If an economy has had fewer than ve cases a year over the past ve years involving
a judicial reorganization, judicial liquidation, or foreclosure, the economy receives a no
practiceranking. This means that creditors are unlikely to recover their money through
a formal legal process (in or out of court). The recovery rate for no practiceeconomies
is zero. After dropping data entries labeled as no practice, closing-a-business measures
are available for 94 countries in the full sample.
To validate the main result, I also use a third measure strength of legal rights
index (DomEnf_LR) from getting credit methodology to evaluate the degree to
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and
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thus facilitate lending. The last and fourth measure, domestic credit to private sector
(DomEnf_CREDIT ), gauges the degree of sophistication and development in nancial
intermediation, therefore a higher value is symptomatic of better nancial services hence
more accessible private credit within a countrys borders.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of variables used in the baseline model.
Among all potential explanatory variables, these substitutable measures of contracting
institutions are correlated with each other both within (italic numbers in Table 3) and
across (bold numbers in Table 3) my classication of three aspects of contract enforce-
ment. Considering the univariate correlations between the amount of external debt and
alternative proxies from each category of institutions, a number of signicant correlations
emerge (rst column of Table 3) ranging from a low of -0.23 to a high of 0.42.
8.3 Instrumental Variables
The instruments I work with include: logarithm of settler mortality, logarithm of popula-
tion density in the 1500s, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and legal origin (consisting of
British, French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavia). Settlersmortality and population
density in the 1500s are for former colonies. In a famous paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson [2001], while trying to explain the impact of institutions on per-capita income,
use the settlersmortality rate as an instrument to control for the endogeneity of institu-
tions. Data on population density in the 1500s come from Acemoglu and Johnson [2005],
where they advise the usage of settlersmortality and population density as instruments
for property rights institution. The next instrument, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, is
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dened as the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Classication of ethnolinguistic groups and
according probability data are draw from Roeders [2001] ELF indexes computed for the
year of 1985. Mauro [1995] and Faria and Mauro [2009] use this variable as instrument for
institutional qualities. Data on legal origin are taken from La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny [1999], and justied as proper instrument for contract enforcement
by Amin and Ranjan [2008]. When I restrict countires to have available data on other
three instruments, the baseline sample shrinks to 54 countries (further to 42 if a full
set of control variables is requred) and contains no country that inherits German and
Scandinavian legal origins; hence this legal origin instrument degenerates to two binary
indicators (British and French) after the intercept term (Socialist) is included in the rst
stage regression.
9 Empirical Results
In my complete debt sample consisting of 134 countries, total external debt stocks in
2008 consist of on average 81% long term (17% of which ows to private sectors as
nonguaranteed debt and 83% to public and publicly guaranteed destinations), 15% short
term, and 2% use of IMF credit. The share of private nonguaranteed debt as total debt
is growing steadily since 2004, reaches a peak at 2008, and falls in 2009 likely due to the
aftermath of U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. As the share of long term debt stays roughly
stable, the remaining component of public and publicly guaranteed debt is decreasing over
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the same period. However, the cross-sectional correlation between private and public debt
is still high at around 0.83.
Before turning to estimates of equation (12), I check whether single contracting in-
stitution by itself is an important determinant of external debt stocks. I do this by
conducting "univariate" regressions with each kind of institutions. Notice that the size
of economy GDP or the level of economic development GDPCap (log GDP per capita
in thousands of U.S. dollars at current prices) is included depending upon specications.
The results of this procedure are summarized in Table 4. Columns (1)-(3) report the es-
timated relationship between the total level of debt and respective measures for interna-
tional contract enforcement, general judicial quality, and domestic contract enforcement.
Columns (4)-(6) report the same regressions using per-capita debt as dependent vari-
ables. The conclusion is that if we consider a single aspect of institutions at a time then
one observes that only counties with strong protection on foreign investment accumulate
larger stocks of private external debt. However, general judicial quality or domestic con-
tract enforcement (which is my primary concern) alone has limited explanatory power,
highlighting the necessity of including all three institutional factors.
Turning to my baseline estimating equation with multivariate measures of institu-
tional quality, results are presented in Table 5 with international contract enforcement
proxied by the average ICRGs IRIS-3 measure of repudiation and expropriation risk,
IntlEnf_R&E, and general judicial quality proxied by the EFW measure of legal en-
forcement on contracts, Q_ENF . Columns (1)-(3) present results using the average
closing-a-business measure of domestic credit accessibility due to enforcement on a con-
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Table 4: External Private Debt and Single Set of Contracting Institutions
Debt Stocks Regressions Per-Capita Debt Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IntlEnf_R&E 4.66 0.14
(1.73) (0.07)
Q_ENF 2.05 0.04
(1.06) (0.04)
DomEnf_T&C -3.26 -0.09
(2.18) (0.08)
GDP 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDPCap 0.31 0.42 0.45
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Cons: -22.52 -2.96 22.85 -2.80 -2.84 -2.51
(10.64) (4.49) (12.03) (0.43) (0.45) (0.06)
Obs: 84 101 110 84 101 110
R2 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.32 0.28
Notes: The dependent variables are the private nonguaranteed external debt in the
form of debt stocks (1)-(3) and per-capita level (4)-(6). Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Ordinary squares regressions on time serial (2004-2008 or -2009 depending upon
specications) averages within countries.  signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%; 
signicant at 10%.
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tract between citizens, DomEnf_T&C, columns (4)-(6) using the closing-a-business
recovery rate, DomEnf_REC, columns (7)-(8) using the getting-credit legal rights in-
dex, DomEnf_LR, and columns (9)-(10) using the domestic credit to private sector
measure, DomEnf_CREDIT . I begin by focusing on the interactions between three
sets of contracting institutions without other potential determinants. The results are
reported in columns (1), (4), (7), and (9). The coe¢ cient of domestic contract enforce-
ment is large, negative, and statistically signicant at 1% for my primary measure. The
result is conrmed by other alternative measures of domestic contract enforcement being
negative and, at least minimally, signicant at 10%.18 This is consistent with the dis-
cussion following the theoretical model that easier internal credit is expected to tighten
external credit constraint. Not surprisingly, the coe¢ cients of other two sets of contract-
ing institutions involving with foreign claims and general legal quality are positive and
signicant. It is meaningful to directly compare the magnitude of three institutional
measures in column (1), since all of them are dened roughly in the same range of [0; 10].
The magnitude of the negative e¤ect is economically signicant and comparable to those
positive e¤ects. This observation is reasonable robust to changes in the set of controls as
in columns (2) and (3).
Next, I control for the size of the economy, GDP , and the severity of punishment via
trade sanction, NetIM , as determinants of private debt stocks. These two variables seem
to play a considerable role with statistically and economically signicant impact in all
18The parameter associated with DomEnf_CREDIT is positive in specication (10) since domestic
credit is highly positively correlated with GDP , which is in turn in a positive relationship with debt
level. One will see the parameter becomes negative after GDP is controlled for.
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specications. Total external debt owed by private sectors is positively correlated with
economic size perhaps because economic outputs provides collateral to foreign creditors,
and imports because borrowers cannot a¤ord a default in anticipation of foreign creditors
ability to cease exports against defaulting parties (but when domestic credit is used as a
regressor, the correlation with imports turns to negative due to the potential interaction
between domestic credit and net imports). I also control for other determinants of debt
stocks that, if omitted, may bias the estimated importance of contract enforcement. In
specic, I include natural resource abundance, NR, indicators of educational attainment,
H, and residentsholding of external assets, Asset. All these variables can be considered
as some kind of repayment assurance. Accordingly, they are positively associated with the
debt level. However, only the coe¢ cient of NR is signicant and robust across di¤erent
specications. The overall ability of these independent variables to t the cross-sectional
variation in the total external debt is considerable with R2 ranging from 0.77 to 0.81 in
all full-loaded specications.
10 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I outline several potential concerns regarding my main estimates, seek
evidence to alleviate hesitations, and report the related ndings, as follows. Note that in
all robust regression, I report only the results with DomEnf_T&C as the measure of
domestic contract enforcement. The usage of alternative measures for domestic contract
enforcement leads to similar results.
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10.1 Changes in the Sample
The results are robust to two alternative samples as shown in Table 6. One is an enlarged
sample augmented by debt data on additional countries and the year of 2009, which are
made available by a wider coverage of self-constructed Q_ENF measure. The other is a
narrower sample that restricts countries to those with strictly positive amount of private
debt for at least one year within the baseline sample period of 2004-2008.
10.2 Expanding the List of Explanatory Variables
The main result holds when I introduce a number of additional determinants as regres-
sors. I compare two competing measures of capital controls, and choose EFWs index
for the rest of the specications for the reason of data availability. The coe¢ cient on
DomEnf_T&C is essentially unchanged and remains signicant until the size of domes-
tic stock market is added, whereas new regressors are never statistically signicant except
for the binary indicator of OECD membership. The signs of coe¢ cients for these new
regressors are as expected. Fewer restrictions on capital ows are always positively asso-
ciated with private debt owed across borders. OECD membership signicantly increases
borrowing. Higher ination signals failed monetary policy, economic mismanagement and
instability thus raises the probability of defaults. Domestic stock market development
may help attract not only foreign equity and direct investment, but also portfolio debt
and loan. Table 7 reports the ndings.
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Table 6: Robustness Regression: Enlarging and Narrowing Sample Size
Enlarged Sample Narrower Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IntlEnf_R&E 6.76 4.15 3.31 7.91 4.75 2.46
(2.48) (2.02) (1.78) (3.68) (2.96) (2.18)
Q_ENF 6.33 3.61 1.30 8.13 4.74 2.59
(2.04) (1.67) (1.25) (2.46) (2.06) (1.46)
DomEnf_T&C -9.84 -5.54 -4.11 -10.01 -5.79 -4.98
(3.49) (2.84) (1.94) (3.95) (3.25) (2.08)
GDP 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
NetIM 0.26 0.47 0.24 0.44
(0.13) (0.21) (0.13) (0.22)
NR 0.41 0.42
(0.06) (0.06)
H 0.22 0.30
(0.30) (0.33)
Asset 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Cons: -0.66 -3.75 -3.44 -13.57 -10.47 1.64
(23.52) (18.90) (16.08) (35.32) (28.54) (19.31)
Obs: 78 77 60 55 55 49
R2 0.24 0.55 0.78 0.30 0.58 0.78
Notes: The dependent variable is external debt stocks, private nonguaranteed. The
enlarged sample includes additional countries and year 2009 made available by self-
constructed Q_ENF measure. The narrower sample excludes those countries with
external private debt equating to zeros. Standard errors in parentheses. Ordinary
squares regressions on time-serial averages (2004-2009 in the enlarged sample, 2004-2008
in the narrower sample, and 2004-2007 whenever Asset is included as a regressor). 
signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 10%.
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Table 7: Robustness Regression: Expanding the List of Explanatory Vari-
ables
Benchmark Additional Regressors Added
CC OECD Inflation MktCap
IntlEnf_R&E 3.31 3.25 1.25 1.15 1.48
(1.78) (1.79) (1.85) (1.89) (2.67)
Q_ENF 1.30 1.19 0.54 0.60 0.78
(1.25) (1.28) (1.23) (1.30) (1.70)
DomEnf_T&C -4.11 -4.09 -3.66 -3.88 -3.50
(1.94) (1.96) (1.85) (1.91) (2.35)
GDP 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
NetIM 0.47 0.47 0.29 0.26 0.16
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.30)
NR 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
H 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.18
(0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.38)
Asset 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
CC 0.43 0.22 0.27 0.06
(0.78) (0.74) (0.77) (1.11)
OECD 15.93 17.48 18.32
(5.95) (6.46) (10.43)
Inflation -0.64 -0.52
(4.23) (5.35)
MktCap 0.01
(0.03)
Cons: -3.44 -4.61 8.43 10.01 5.96
(16.08) (16.33) (16.16) (16.56) (24.61)
Obs: 60 60 60 59 46
R2 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.81
Notes: The dependent variable is external debt stocks, private nonguaranteed.
Standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%; 
signicant at 10%.
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10.3 Changes in Dependent Variable
Instead of using the nominal level of debt as dependent variable, I check the per-capita
level in column (1)-(3) of Table 8. All nominal explanatory variables are also transformed
to per-capita level in thousands of U.S. dollars at current prices, by dividing population
data from the same sources. One still observes a negative and statistically signicant
relationship between the size of foreign debt and the accessibility of domestic debt. How-
ever, this relationship no longer exists when I check the power of the same explanatory
variables in explaining foreign debt stocks owed by public sectors. Public and publicly
guaranteed debt seems to be positively associated withDomEnf_T&C, which is reason-
able since the story of atomic defaulters re-accessing market via the non-defaulted does
not equally apply to governmental debt. Although domestic nancial development may
hinder private corporations from borrowing abroad, it indicates governments capabilities
and economic growth potential hence increasing the amount of public debt. The di¤erent
results conrm my assertion in the introduction part that the identity of external debt
borrower could make a di¤erence.
10.4 Alternative Measures for Institutional Quality
I run regressions with alternative measures on my other two sets of contracting institu-
tions. When international contract enforcement is proxied by investment prole ratings
from the ICRGs political risk index, the main result holds and investment prole is sig-
nicant as well. As for alternatives on general judicial quality, the results are only robust
to changes in specication (4), (7), and (9), which include only three sets of institu-
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Table 8: Robustness Regression: Alternative Dependent Variables
Per-Capita Private Debt Public Debt Stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IntlEnf_R&E 0.38 0.20 0.10 5.29 1.53 0.75
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (2.53) (1.70) (1.97)
Q_ENF 0.07 0.02 0.05 4.54 1.39 0.12
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (1.96) (1.34) (1.38)
DomEnf_T&C -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -4.46 0.56 1.64
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (3.25) (2.21) (2.16)
GDP (Cap) 0.33 0.02 0.07 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
NetIM(Cap) 0.34 0.50 0.39 0.38
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.24)
NR(Cap) 0.50 0.32
(0.15) (0.07)
H 0.01 0.41
(0.01) (0.33)
Asset(Cap) 0.17 -0.05
(0.02) (0.06)
Cons: -1.42 -2.36 -0.16 -8.41 -8.50 -10.09
(0.66) (0.63) (0.57) (23.26) (15.40) (17.86)
Obs: 73 73 64 73 73 60
R2 0.32 0.47 0.75 0.19 0.60 0.71
Notes: The dependent variable in specication (1)-(3) is external debt per capita,
private nonguaranteed. The dependent variable in (4)-(6) is external debt stocks,
public and publicly guaranteed. Standard errors in parentheses.  signicant at
1%,  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 10%.
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tional measures and suppress the set of control variables. Nevertheless, those alternative
proxies for general judicial quality are never signicant, indicating their limited ability
to separate di¤erent aspects of institutions comparing to Q_ENF . Table 9 reports the
result of variations.
10.5 Panel Data Methods
Besides the between-e¤ects method, there are three ways to estimate a panel dataset:
pooled OLS, within-e¤ects a.k.a xed-e¤ects, and random-e¤ects strategy. I have ex-
plained why the between-e¤ects estimator is chosen over other estimators in detail. But
it is still worthwhile to run regressions using other panel data techniques for a visualized
comparison. The empirical results are shown in Table 10. Note an array of year dummies
are added to account for the time xed e¤ects. The main result is conrmed by pooled
OLS. Fixed-e¤ects model generates inconsistent result probably because it eliminates the
between-country and focuses on within-country variations. Since private debt is growing
and all countries work on improving domestic institutional system overtime, it is possi-
ble that one observes a positive relationship between them within a country in column
(4). Random-e¤ects estimator in columns (7)-(9) is a weighted average of between-e¤ects
and xed-e¤ects estimators; moreover, it is consistent and e¢ cient under the condition
that country-specic e¤ect is uncorrelated with the regressors. However, this condition
is rejected by Hausman test in our case.
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10.6 Endogeneity
The results of instrumental variable regressions using former colonial variables, ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization, and legal origin as instruments are reported in Table 11 (second
stage result) and Table 12 (rst stage regression). The full sample contains country from
all ve legal origins. But in the sample where data on other instrumental variables are
available, there are no German or Scandinavian legal origin countries. Consequently, only
British and French legal origin appear as an instrument in the specications of Table 12.
The omitted legal origin category is Socialist.
The identifying assumption is that these instruments Z a¤ect institutional quality,
i.e., cov (Z; IntlEnf) 6= 0, cov (Z;Q) 6= 0, as well as cov (Z;DomEnf) 6= 0, and in-
stitutional quality in turn a¤ects the external debt stocks, with no other links between
debt and these instruments, i.e., cov (Z; ") = 0. In column (2) of Table 11, all three sets
of contracting institution are instrumented, but the corresponding rst stage results, as
presented in columns (1)-(3) of Table 12, show that (I) only settlersmortality is a valid
instrument for international contract enforcement; (II) only estimates on legal origins
are signicant when general judicial quality is the dependent variable; and (III) domestic
contract enforcement seems to be not correlated with all my instruments. In the litera-
ture, there exists no evidence that external debt can directly a¤ect the part of domestic
nancial development contributed by institutional attributes. The channel is indirect:
external debt a¤ects general legal quality, and then the positive e¤ect is passed onto do-
mestic contract enforcement, at last materialized in the ease of obtaining domestic credit.
Therefore in column (3) of Table 11, I treat domestic contract enforcement as exogenous,
71
and instrument for international contract enforcement and general judicial quality. In
both scenarios, columns (2) and (3) of Table 11, the IV coe¢ cient on DomEnf_T&C
rises in absolute value compared with the corresponding OLS estimation. This result is
consistent with previous literature using similar instruments to exclude reverse impact
on institutional qualities. A common explanation is that these instruments may a¤ect
debt outcomes through channels other than contracting institutions [see, e.g., La Porta
et al. 1998; Mahoney 2001; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;
Ranjan and Lee, 2007; Faria and Mauro, 2009]. In terms of my framework, this would
amount to cov (Z; ") 6= 0, violating the exclusion restriction.
11 Conclusions
This study has shown that the ease of obtaining domestic private credit, which might be
a direct result of enhancing domestic contract enforcement, could potentially decrease
the amount that private sectors are able to borrow overseas. I emphasize on the identity
of the borrower (corporations and households versus governmental entities) in external
debt, which may eventually lead to contradictory result using the same set of explanatory
factors. Like previous works, external debt stocks are signicantly associated with indi-
cators of international contract enforcement and general courtsquality, as well as costs
of future exclusion from international capital markets (measured by net imports of goods
and services) and natural resources abundance (measured by net exports of agricultural
raw materials, fuels, ores, and metals). Educational attainment as a proxy of human
72
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capital accumulation and external asset stocks as a proxy of loan collateral are occasion-
ally signicant in my regressions. My interpretation of the novel result is that improving
institutions alone may fail to attain the economic goal of promoting private borrowing
abroad. This policy should be combined with eliminating discrimination against foreign
creditors, otherwise, institutional quality may cause foreign creditors to tighten credit
constraint and hence reduce the amount lent to domestic private sectors. In conclusion,
foreign lenders tend to invest more in private sectors whose host countries have weaker
domestic contract enforcement or other unobserved characteristics that will harm private
sectors backup plan after an international default.
Part IV
The Extensive Margin of Intrarm
Trade
12 Introduction
Recent rm-level approach reveals that uctuations in intra-industry trade are dominated
by extensive margin. To be specic, the variations in the number of exporters and the
scope of exported varieties (extensive margin) account for a greater share of the changes
in aggregate trade than the variation in the average exports per rm-variety (intensive
75
margin).19 Does intrarm trade follow a similar pattern? This paper denes intrarm
trade as domestic headquarters(henceforth HQ) imports of manufactured parts from
foreign upstream a¢ liates within a rms boundaries. Like previous literature,20 the
share of intrarm imports as total U.S. imports is found to be higher, the higher the HQ-
services-input intensity of the industry of foreign a¢ liates in a cross-industry dataset. The
novel nding is that this increase in intrarm imports is mainly due to the acquisition
of a large number of productive foreign a¢ liates. In a cross-country dataset, on the one
hand, lower export costs attracts more manufactured-parts-input suppliers to enter the
export marketplace, and on the other hand, lower wage and better contract enforcement
attract greater amounts of U.S. direct investment in a country. The paper demonstrates
these attractions materialize mostly in terms of larger numbers of export a¢ liates than
in terms of more cross-border sales per a¢ liate.
Firms endogenous choice of a¢ liate number can be rationalized in a theoretical
framework that combines three ingredients Antràsproperty-rights model of vertically
fragmented production, Melitzs view of productivity heterogeneity applied to exporting
a¢ liates, and a multiproduct setup widely used in the industrial organization literature.
Deviated from the seminal work of Antràs (2003), where a single-product rm decides
whether to integrate its sole supplier as a¢ liate or outsource from it as an outsider, this
paper studies the organizational choice of a single-brand multiproduct rm consisting of
one HQ and a spectrum of suppliers. Each product is distinct, thus requires two specially
designed intermediate inputs manufactured parts made by a supplier and paired HQ
19See, e.g., Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009).
20See, e.g., Antràs (2003); Nunn and Treer (2008).
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services provided by the HQ. Contract incompleteness leads to ex-ante underinvestment
in both intermediate inputs. Ex post, all suppliers under the same brand name unite to
bargain with the HQ over allocation of sales revenue. There is a trade-o¤ in integrat-
ing many suppliers as a¢ liates: it strengthens HQs bargaining power but discouraging
investment in manufactured parts. Benets outweigh costs when HQ services are more
important in all product lines. Di¤erent suppliers bring di¤erent productivity draws into
their respective nal-good productions. In the presence of xed integration costs, only
suppliers with high productivity levels will be integrated. The optimal bargaining result
can thus be attained by internalizing the fewest number of suppliers. In an open econ-
omy, manufactured parts are traded across borders, but nal varieties are nontradable.
The coexistence of beachhead costs and productivity heterogeneity implies endogenous
selection of exporters in the foreign country. Exporting suppliers not only have higher
productivity than local suppliers on average but also result in the invention of new va-
rieties. With access to exporters, domestic HQ redraws rm boundary a fraction of
domestic a¢ liates with relatively lower productivity ranks are rearranged as stand-alone
outsiders to make some spaces for competent newcomers from the foreign country.
Related literature. This paper is related to several branches of literature. First
and foremost, the paper builds upon nascent works that consider rm boundary as a
mechanism to reduce bargaining ine¢ ciency in an incomplete contract environment. This
growing body of literature stems from Antràs (2003), where a supplier providing labor
intensive inputs is internalized by the HQ if nal-variety production involves more capital-
intensive inputs. Trade happens because countries di¤er in factor endowment. In a more
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recent paper, Antràs (2005) applies this idea to study products life cycle in a North-
South trade model, in which the South endures incomplete contracts whereas the North
is endowed with well-established contracting institutions. Antràs and Helpman (2004)
develop a property-rights theory of transnational rm that allows for intra-industry het-
erogeneity in HQs productivity as in Melitz (2003) combined with the organizational
structure as in Antràs (2003). Their main result is that high productivity parent rm in
HQ-intensive sectors are more likely to choose integration strategies, while in component-
intensive sectors outsourcing is pervasive. Antràs and Helpman (2008) then generalize
this framework. In addition to assuming di¤erent contractibility across countries, they
accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions across intermediate input invest-
ments. HQ and its suppliers undertake a continuum of relation-specic investments, with
only a fraction of these investments contractible as in Acemoglu, Antràs, and Helpman
(2007), to produce one intermediate input used in the production of nal variety. They
nd that better contracting in South cause an increase in the prevalence of foreign di-
rect investment (FDI hereafter) and related-party trade if the institutional improvement
a¤ects disproportionately the contractibility of inputs provided by suppliers rather than
the HQ. Empirical evidence for the main predictions in Antràs (2003) and Antràs and
Helpman (2004; 2008) is provided by Nunn and Treer (2008). Secondly, this paper ap-
plies the rm-level heterogeneity of Melitz (2003) to a¢ liate level. Manufacturing plants
are the exporters in this model, and HQ can still di¤er in overall productivity derived
from a combination of all its a¢ liatesproductivities. Thirdly, the multiproduct setup
allows this paper to introduce multiple a¢ liates within a rm or brand and, more im-
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portantly, to generate the rationalization of a¢ liate scope after trade opening, which is
similar to the variety scope adjustments under trade shocks in Ma (2008). Finally, mul-
tiple a¢ liates can be modeled through alternative ways. Schwarz (2009) studies single
product requiring multiple inputs besides HQ services, with each input supplied by an
individual plant either as an a¢ liate or outsider. His formulation leads to the prediction
that plants producing complex inputs that are proximate to the nal-good are more likely
to be integrated. Since plants are exogenously di¤erent by the denition of production
function, there is no dynamics of sorting into di¤erent organizational forms, which in
turn is of critical importance to generate the extensive margin of intrarm trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The paper begins with analysis of
a closed economy in section 13. Section 14 studies a two-country open economy and
discusses the impact of trade liberalization on structural reorganization. The paper then
investigates the main predictions using data on U.S. multinational companies in section
15. Section 16 concludes, followed by a technical Appendix C including all derivations.
13 Closed Economy Equilibrium
Consider the home country in autarky.
Demand. A representative consumer has CES preference over a continuum of dif-
ferent brands, i 2 [0; 1],
Q =
Z 1
i=0
q(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
;  > 1:
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The brand output q(i) represents the aggregated quantity of a basket of nal varieties,
j 2 
,21
q(i) =
Z
j2

qj(i)
 1
 dj
 
 1
;  > 1; (13)
where qj(i) is the variety output for j under brand i. One can think of this commod-
ity hierarchy as capturing an industry (e.g., portable consumer electronics in the U.S.)
consisting of many brands (e.g., Microsoft, Apple, Google, Sony, Amazon), under which
the HQ of each brand supplies a line of varieties (e.g., laptop, smart phone, MP3 player,
eBook reader, tablet) to local customers.
The price index for consumption composite Q is denoted as
P =
Z 1
i=0
p(i)1 di
 1
1 
;
where p(i) is the price index for q(i),
p(i) =
Z
j2

pj(i)
1 dj
 1
1 
;
and pj(i) is the unit price of qj(i). Take the consumption composite and two tiers of
price indices as given, the demand functions for brand output and variety output are,
respectively,
q(i) = QP p(i) ; 8i;
21
 is the set of goods available to consumers in the home country. Though xed in a closed economy,
its size will be endogenously determined after opening to trade of intermediate inputs.
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and
qj(i) = QP
p(i) pj(i) ; 8i; j:
The total revenue generated by sales of brand output is
R(i) = p(i)q(i)
= Q
1
Pq(i)
 1
 : (14)
Alternatively, this revenue can be viewed as the summation of all variety revenues under
the same brand,
R(i) =
Z
j2

Rj(i)dj;
where variety revenue is dened as below,
Rj(i) = pj(i)qj(i)
= Q
1
P

 p(i)
 
 qj(i)
 1
 : (15)
Moreover, the fraction of brand revenue that is contributed by sales of variety j is pro-
portional to variety output as a fraction of brand output,
Rj(i)
R(i)
=

qj(i)
q(i)
 1

: (16)
Production. The production of any variety j involves two parties one HQ de-
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noted by H, who owns the brand, and one manufacturing plant denoted as Mj.22 The
technology is a Cobb-Douglas assembly of two variety-specic intermediate inputs: HQ
services, hj, and manufactured parts, mj.
qj = zj

hj
h
h mj
m
m
; h 2 [0; 1] ; m = 1  h; (17)
where zj is the productivity parameter, whereas h and m are, respectively, the intensity
parameters for hj and mj. Intensity parameters are the characteristics associated with
the brand, hence, the same across di¤erent varieties managed by that brand. HQ services
can be produced only by H with a variable cost ch per unit of hj, and manufactured parts
can be produced only by Mj with a variable cost cm per unit of mj.23 By denition, H
must hire a Mj in order to produce variety j at some productivity level zj, which is
drawn by Mj from a known distribution G(z) with support [zmin; zmax]. Productivity
parameters are asymmetric across varieties within one brand. Each Mj realizes its own
productivity upon the establishment of cooperation agreements with the HQ.
It is assumed that both intermediate inputs for one variety are specially designed for
its use, therefore worthless for other varieties. As a result, there exists two-way hold-up
problem given contracts are incomplete.24 After investments in inputs have been made,
H and a coalition of all manufacturing plants, denoted as M , play a generalized Nash
22Since brands are symmetric, the paper will focus on one brand from now on, and drop i in the
brackets to avoid clutter.
23In an open economy, this assumption prohibits HQ from building manufactured plants in a foreign
country from scratch (the so-called Greeneld). Therefore, the only way to set up a foreign a¢ liate is
by acquiring existing exporters.
24Incomplete contract in this paper means that the share of brand revenue apportioned to the HQ is
the only item can be contracted upon.
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bargaining game to determine the allocation of brand revenue R. H gains h 2 [0; 1]
fraction, andM gains m = 1 h fraction. Since h will depend solely upon bargaining
powers ex post, ex-ante investments are ine¢ cient. To provide investment incentives, H
builds up the optimal balance of bargaining powers between itself and M .
The hiring relationship between H and a singleMj can either take the form of vertical
integration or outsourcing. With vertical integration, H pays a xed fee to acquire Mj
as one of its subsidiaries; hence, obtain the right to seize a fraction of Mjs output
when bargaining breaks down. Anticipating this loss of ex-post bargaining power and
a corresponding decrease in revenue share, Mj will further decrease investment. With
outsourcing, H buys manufactured parts from an outsider Mj and thus exposes to the
threat of cutting o¤ supply. A raise in Mjs ex-post bargaining power increases m but
encouraging investment.
An organizational form, denoted by  2  , is dened as a spectrum of binary hiring
choices for all plants Mj; j 2 
. There is a one-to-one mapping between the set of
organizational forms,  , and the share of brand revenue ows to the HQ, h. In other
words, choosing   is equivalent to choosing its corresponding h. For example, consider
two elements in a set of organizational forms: k; l 2  . Without loss of generality,
suppose k represents integrating Mjs with j  k, while l represents integrating Mjs
with j  l. Although they have di¤erent integration strategies, both lead to the same
pattern of brand revenue allocation.
To sum up, the HQ faces the trade-o¤ that an integration oriented   reduces R but
increases h, while an outsourcing oriented   sacrices h to improve R. The optimal
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set   relies on the intensity of HQ services, h. The nal choice of element  relies on
the distribution of productivity draws, zj, over all varieties under the brand of H.
Timing. The timing of events is as follows.
1. 8j,H enters into a cooperation agreement with any one plant among a large number
of identical candidates, and refers to the selected as Mj.
2. A 
 set of Mjs nd out their productivity draws separately, and found M to ght
for a more favorable bargaining result.
3. H chooses   to set up according bargaining powers.
4. H chooses  from   to minimize the integration costs.
5. H and M simultaneously choose their optimal investments in intermediate inputs
fhjgj2
 and fmjgj2
, respectively.
6. Bargain over the incoming R begins, H proposes a revenue dividing scheme which
keeps h fraction to itself, and o¤ers the rest to M .
7. If M rejects, M gets nothing while H seizes a fraction of qj from each integrated
Mj dened in .
8. IfM accepts the o¤er, thenM transports fmjgj2
 toH, where qj amount of variety
j is assembled, 8j.
9. Revenue R is collected, then divided in proportions specied in the o¤er.
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10. M distributes its share of prot, mR, to all Mjs in a pro rata share of their
contributions mRj to plant Mj; 8j.
Profit maximization. The prot maximization problem is solved using backward
induction.
At step 5, the optimal  , or equivalently, h is known. Given fmjgj2
, H maximizes
its share of prot by choosing investments in various HQ services.
max
fhjgj2

hR  ch
Z
j2

hjdj;
subject to brand output (13), the denition of brand revenue (14), and variety production
functions (17). Similarly, M maximizes its prot given fhjgj2
.
max
fmjgj2

mR  cm
Z
j2

mjdj;
subject to Eqs. (13), (14) and (17). Combine the rst order conditions with Eq. (16),
this noncooperative game yields:
8>><>>:
hj =

hh
ch

 1

Rj;
mj =

mm
cm

 1

Rj;
(18)
for all j 2 
.
At step 3, H observes all the productivity draws in its manufacturing facilities, and
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chooses h to maximize ex-ante total prot.
  max
h
Z
j2

Rjdj   ch
Z
j2

hjdj   cm
Z
j2

mjdj; (19)
subject to Eqs. (15) and (17), as well as incentive compatibility constraints (18) from
step 5. Substitute all the constraints into the objective function to obtain an alternative
maximization problem,25
 = max
h
Z  A;
where Z is some measure of overall brand productivity,
Z 
Z
j2

z 1j dj
 1 
1 
;
the constant component in A reects the impacts from consumer demands and variable
costs of input investment on prot, and the variant component in A represents the trade-
o¤ between revenue pie and HQs slice,
A  QP 

   1

 1
c
 h( 1)
h c
 m( 1)
m| {z }
Constant Component


1 

   1


(hh + mm)


h( 1)
h 
m( 1)
m| {z }
Variant Component
:
To nd the optimum, it is su¢ cient to maximize the variant component in A subject to
25See the derivation in Appendix C.
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m = 1   h and m = 1   h. If H can choose h freely from the [0; 1] interval, then
there is an unique analytical expression for the optimal share of revenue,
h (h) =
h [1 + (   1) h] 
p
h (1  h) [   (   1) h] [1 + (   1) h]
 (2h   1)
; h 6=
1
2
;
with h
 
1
2

= 1
2
.26 Note h (0) = 0, 

h (1) = 1, 
0
h (h) > 0, 
00
h (h) > 0 when h >
1
2
and 00h (h) < 0 when h <
1
2
.
Proposition 6 Brands with high intensity in HQ services tend to acquire strong bar-
gaining power against a group of collusive upstream plants.
Choices of organizational form.More notations are needed to discuss the
optimal organizational form . Consider a generalized Nash bargaining game, where two
players bargain over a certain amount. Assume the results under equivalent bargaining
powers are always the same such that  fraction is distributed to one party (without loss
of generality, say, the HQ) and the rest to another party (the suppliersunion). Let 
be the fraction of qj that can still be produced when bargain fails and, consequently, H
seizes some manufactured parts from Mj if Mj is an integrated a¢ liate.
What H chooses in the original problem (19) is the set of organizational forms,  ,
which is lower bounded by a singleton,  O, where H outsources from all Mj, and upper
bounded by another singleton,  I , where all plants are integrated byH. These boundaries
restrict H to choose h from a subset of [0; 1], namely,
h
;  + (1  )  1
i
. If H chooses
 O, then bargain breakdown leaves 0 residual to both H and M . Since the amount to
26See the derivation in Appendix C.
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bargain over is the brand revenue R, H gains R, whileM gains (1  )R. If H chooses
 I , then the outside option forM is again 0 whenM rejects the o¤er, but H will be able
to produce  fraction of qj for all variety j 2 
. According to Eq. (13), q quantities of
brand output are sold, and further translated into a sales revenue of 
 1
 R. The amount
that is subject to bargaining becomes

1    1

R. Therefore, H gains
h
 + (1  )  1
i
R = 
 1
 R| {z }
Outside Option
+ 

1    1

R| {z }
Bargain Share
;
and leaves the rest, (1 )

1    1

R, toM . IfH chooses an o¤-boundary set, denoted
by  Mix, then some plants in M are integrated a¢ liates while others are outsiders.
However, it is still unclear which plants to integrate, since  Mix is no longer a singleton.
To nd out the answer, an additional problem has to be solved.
At step 4, taking  Mix as given, H picks out the element that minimizes the total
costs incurred in integration.
min
2 Mix
fI  number of integrated plants in ;
where fI denotes the xed fee to integrate any one manufacturing plant. There is however
no such costs for outsourcing, fO = 0. Rank all plants under the same brand from high
to low according to their productivity draws, i.e., zj  zk; 8j < k and j; k 2 
. To attain
the desired revenue share with the smallest number of a¢ liates, H starts integration from
M0, who possesses the highest productivity technology, and continues to do so towards
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the other end. Suppose H arrives at h after acquiring Mk with a cuto¤ productivity,
zk. Put it another way, all Mjs with zj  zk are integrated facilities, and the rest with
zj < zk are outsiders. When two parties fail to reach an agreement, M gains nothing as
usual, while H now produce "k fraction of q. Dene "k 2 [0; ] as
"k 
R
jk q
 1

j dj

q

 1
:
Using Eqs. (13), (17), (18), and (C.1)27, this fraction degenerates to
"k = 
0B@Rjk z
( 1)2+( 1)

j djR
j2
 z
( 1)2+( 1)

j dj
1CA

 1
= 
 R
jk z
 1
j djR
j2
 z
 1
j dj
! 
 1
= Z

1 
Z
jk
z 1j dj
 
 1
: (20)
Therefore, H gains
h
 + (1  )"
 1

k
i
R, and leaves the rest, (1   )

1  "
 1

k

R, to
M .2829
Let Lh and 
H
h denote, respectively, the HQ services intensities lead to lower and
27Essentially as for the integration over j is concerned, one can treat Rj as K  z 1j , and K can be
taken outside the integration.
28Notice "k = 0 implies that  Mix shrinks to  O, and "k =  takes one back to  I :
29If all plants are ranked from low to high instead, then H stops the process of integration at Ml: The
fraction "k will be dened as,
"k  
 R
j6l z
 1
j djR
j2
 z
 1
j dj
! 
 1
:
To attain the same value of "k; a larger number of a¢ liates (l > k) is required in this alternative ranking
method, which is less preferred.
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upper boundaries. They are implicitly dened by
8>><>>:
h
 
Lh

= ;
h
 
Hh

=
h
 + (1  )  1
i
:
Proposition 7 In a closed economy, if all manufacturing plants under brand i, Mj(i),
are ranked by their productivity draws zj in a descending order, then the HQ of this brand,
H(i), will adopt the organizational form depending upon its intensity parameter of HQ
services. Specically, H(i) adopts
1.  O if h(i) 2

0; Lh (i)

;
2.  I if h(i) 2

Hh (i); 1

;
3. k(i) 2  Mix if h(i) 2
 
Lh (i) ; 
H
h (i)

, where k(i) represents integrating Mj(i) with
j  k(i) and outsources from Mj(i) with j > k(i); 8j 2 
.
In conclusion, the optimal set of organizational forms   is mapped one-to-one to
h (h). Hence,   depends solely upon the intensity parameter of the HQ services, h. The
optimal element,  2  , is mapped one-to-one to k after all plants are ranked. Figure 3
gives an illustration. Brands di¤er in organizational forms: greater HQ services intensity,
h(i), results in an integration oriented strategy a larger k(i) number of a¢ liates.
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Figure 3: Choices of Organizational Form
Notes: The curve in the right panel is the function of optimal revenue allocation to the HQ given
the intensity parameter. The concave function in the left panel represents revenue shares gen-
erated through ordering suppliers on the [0;
] interval from high to low by their productivities,
whereas the convex function below represents a low to high ranking.
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14 Open Economy and The Impact of Trade Liber-
alization
The world consists of two countries: home and foreign. Assume only manufactured parts
are traded across borders, whereas varieties are nontradable. To be consistent with the
previous example of portable electronics industry, one can think of the following stylized
fact most parts of iPod shu­ e are made in factories outside the U.S., however, the
primary target of sales is the U.S. market.
Using an apostrophe, the foreign brand that corresponds to home brand i is denoted
by i0. Foreign plants under brand i0 can only serve the corresponding home brand i. A
new domestic variety under brand i with its manufactured parts supplied by a foreign
plant is denoted as j0 2 
0. The manufactured parts for variety j0 are produced by a
foreign plant, Mj0, with a variable cost c0m < cm per unit of mj0. For simplicity, the xed
fee of acquiring a foreign plant is the same as integrating a domestic plant. It is also
assumed that the domestic HQ can only collaborate with exporting foreign manufacturing
plants. Foreign plants face two types of costs when ship their manufactured parts to the
home country a xed cost to start exporting, f , and a unit export cost,  . It is only
after the realization of productivity draws that foreign manufacturers decide whether to
export based on the below free entry condition:
mRj0   ( + c0m)mj0  f; (21)
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where foreign plant j0s export revenue Rj0 and cross-border salesmj0 are dened similarly
as in Eq. (15) and (18), respectively. The export prot in the left hand side is strictly
increasing in zj0.30 This condition implies that only foreign plants with productivity
level, zj0 > z, will export and make positive prot out of intrarm trade. Assume
maxfzj0 : zj0 > zg > zk to capture the idea that foreign entrance indeed a¤ects the
organizational choice of domestic HQ.31 Home and foreign are identical except for labor
(variable) cost and the distribution of a¢ liate productivity levels. Note that, although
all foreign plants draw productivity from the same distribution G () as their domestic
counterparties, actual exporting foreign plants form a di¤erent conditional distribution.
In an open economy, the revenue share apportioned to H stays unchanged.
h =
h
 + (1  )"
 1

k
i
=
h
 + (1  )"
 1

k0
i
) "k = "k0 :
With foreign subsidiaries involved, the fraction of brand output that can be captured by
the HQ, "k0, is now dened as
"k0 = Z
0 
1 
24Z
jk0
z 1j dj
 
 1
+
 Z zj0
zj0>z
z 1j0 dj
0
! 
 1
35 ;
where Z 0 is the new measure of overall brand productivity with foreign participation.
30See the derivation in Appendix C.
31Conversely, maxfzj0 : zj0 > zg 6 zk suggests that all exporting foreign plants will become outside
suppliers. For boundary solutions, we no longer need this assumption. Instead let zk = zmax when  O
is the right organizational form, and zk = zmin when  I is chosen.
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Recall the denition of "k in Eq. (20),
Z

1 
Z
jk
z 1j dj
 
 1
= Z 0

1 
24Z
jk0
z 1j dj
 
 1
+
 Z
zj0>z
z 1j0 dj
0
! 
 1
35 :
As there are more plants/productivity draws under the same brand, the new overall
productivity measure Z 0 > Z. Therefore, we must have k0 < k in order to make the
above equation satised.
International trade is benecial since, on the one hand, domestic consumers have ac-
cess to new varieties invented with foreign suppliersparticipation (the basket of domestic
consumption becomes 
[
0), and on the other hand, domestic HQ improves protability
by operating at a high aggregate productivity Z 0 and low investment costs c0m.
32
Proposition 8 When the market of intermediate inputs in the home country is open to
imports of foreign manufactured parts, brand manager in the home country tends to
1. expand the range of varieties with new varieties invented by the participation of
foreign manufactured parts;
2. rationalize on its organizational form, through substituting a number of domestic
a¢ liates with fewer foreign a¢ liates;
3. integrate a larger scope of foreign a¢ liates when the brands HQ services intensity
32Figure 4 lays out the vertical structure in an open economy. This paper ignores the "market-
seeking" purpose of setting up foreign subsidiaries, which is more common in horizontal FDI than
vertical FDI. Instead the paper focuses on the "factor-seeking" purpose. For example, in the portable
electronics industry, standardized parts are o¤shored to cheaper and more e¢ cient factories in a foreign
country. In addition, the manufactured parts in electronics devices have high value to weight. This saves
transportation costs and thus makes vertical FDI more attractive.
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Figure 4: Trade in Manufactured Parts
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is higher.
Since the total number of integrated plants is shrinking through substituting one
high productive foreign a¢ liate for several relatively low productive domestic a¢ liates,
the HQ lowers expenditures on merger and acquisition, but at the same time maintains
its desired bargaining power.
Proposition 9 When there is trade liberalization in an open economy, specically, a
decrease in exporting costs  and/or entry fee f raises the total amount of intrarm
imports through increasing the number of foreign a¢ liates.
The interpretation is that when  and/or f reduce(s) more foreign plants are qualied
to export according to Eq. (21), as a result, the domestic HQ has access to a larger pool
of potential Merger and Acquisition targets and integrate more of them. One can expect
to observe an increasing volume of manufactured parts transported across borders.
15 Empirical Analysis
The empirical part investigates, separately, the impact of industry characteristics and
trade barriers on the number of foreign a¢ liates as well as their shipments to parent rms,
in a cross-sectional dataset of the year 2007 for multinational companies headquartered
in the United States.
Hypothesis 1 "The extensive margin" of FDI and intrarm trade
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Parent companies in a high HQ-intensity industry (or brand as in this paper) tend to
integrate a large number of foreign a¢ liates with high productivity draws. This increase
in extensive margin contributes to the large volume of intrarm imports, even though high
h can exert a negative impact on imports per a¢ liate via lowering intensive margin.
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At the NAICS 4-digit classication by industry of a¢ liate, Hypothesis 1 is tested
in Eq. (22) with 114 observations on the number of majority-owned nonbank foreign
a¢ liates and their nancial and operating data in an industry, using Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) dataset on U.S. multinational companiesdirect investment abroad. Eq.
(23) considers the overall impacts of extensive and intensive margin on intrarm imports.
In particular, the paper considers the cross-industry regressions with:34
ln(No. of A¢ liatesi) = 0+1 ln

Ki
Li

+2 ln

Mi
Li

+3 ln

RDi
Li

+4 ln

Qi
Li

+ i;
(22)
and
ln(Intrarm Importsi) = 0+1 ln

Ki
Li

+2 ln

Mi
Li

+3 ln

RDi
Li

+4 ln

Qi
Li

+ui;
(23)
where ln(No. of A¢ liatesi) is log of the number of foreign a¢ liates owned by U.S. HQ
in industry i, and ln(Intrarm Importsi) is log of the intrarm U.S. imports shipped by
foreign a¢ liates to their U.S. parent rms as a share of total U.S. imports in industry i;
33According to Eq. (18), the output of manufactured parts per a¢ liate, mj ; is decreasing in HQ-
intensity, h = 1  m:
34Log transformation is used since there is evidence that data are skewed to the right.
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ln

Ki
Li

is log of capital expenditures divided by compensation of employees, and ln

RDi
Li

is log of the research and development expenditures divided by wages;35 ln

Mi
Li

is the
log of expenses on materials such as property, plant, and equipment divided by wages; the
log of a¢ liate sales divided by wages ln

Qi
Li

measures the average a¢ liates productivity
in industry i; i and ui are unobserved industry-specic errors. Capital intensity ln

Ki
Li

and R&D intensity ln

RDi
Li

capture the HQ services intensity. On the contrary, material
intensity ln

Mi
Li

is created to measure the input that is not likely provided by the HQ.
The results are shown in Table 13. In all specications for Eq. (22), the coe¢ cients
for HQ services intensity are positive and signicant, whereas the estimated coe¢ cient
for manufactured parts intensity is negative and signicant. Higher average a¢ liate pro-
ductivity is associated with larger scope of integration. Since standardized coe¢ cients
are reported, one can easily assess and compare their magnitudes. Take column [22-III]
for example. Controlling for all other explanatory variables, an increase of 1 standard
percentage of capital intensity and material intensity results in, respectively, a 0.676 de-
viation increase and a 0.839 deviation decrease in the percentage of a¢ liate numbers.
The estimated coe¢ cient for R&D intensity is however much smaller at 0.262. In all
specications for Eq. (23), this paper concludes that no statistically signicant relation-
ship exists in coe¢ cients for capital and material intensity, probably due to the small
35Since R&D expenditures in Eq. (22) include several zeros, the paper adapts log transformation by
adding a constant 0:5 to each data value.
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sample size. The second part of Hypothesis 1 is veried indirectly. In industry i, dene
Average Imports per A¢ liatei =
Intrarm Importsi
No. of A¢ liatesi
:
Compare column [22-III] and [23-III], an increase of 1 standard unit of capital intensity
causes the overall intrarm trade to increase by 1 Intrarm Importsi, which is smaller
than the increase in aggregate intrarm trade contributed by the newly established a¢ l-
iates alone, 1 No. of A¢ liatesi Average Imports per A¢ liatei. This di¤erence must
come from the negative impacts from a decrease in the sales per a¢ liate.
Hypothesis 2 "The e¤ects of trade liberalization"
A reduction in either the exporting costs  or the entry fee f leads to an expansion in
the range of exporting foreign a¢ liates and a resulting increase in total intrarm trade.
This prediction is estimated by the following regressions that look across 109 countries:
ln(No. of A¢ liatesc) = 00+
0
1 ln( c) +
0
2 ln(fc) +
0
3 ln(Enfc) +
0
4 ln

Lc
Kc

+ 0c; (24)
and
ln(Related Party Importsc) = 
0
0 + 
0
1 ln( c) + 
0
2 ln(fc) + 
0
3 ln(Enfc) + 
0
4 ln

Lc
Kc

+ u0c;
(25)
where ln(No. of A¢ liatesc) is log of the overall number of foreign a¢ liates operating in
country c owned by U.S. HQ, and ln(Related Party Importsc) is log of the related party
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imports as percentage shares of total imports from all foreign a¢ liates in country c to their
parent rms in the U.S.;36 ln( c) is log of exporting costs per standard container shipped
out of country c (Doing Business Data: Trading Across Borders); ln(fc) is the log of
expenses to start a business in country c (Doing Business Data: Starting a Business), used
to proxy the xed fee of entering into exporting marketplace; ln(Enfc) is log of contract
enforcement costs in country c (Doing Business Data: Enforcing Contracts); ln

Lc
Kc

is
log of foreign a¢ liates compensation on employees divided by capital expenditures; 0i and
u0i are unobserved errors for country-specic characteristics. This paper utilizes the last
two independent variables to control for the di¤erences in contract incompleteness and
labor costs across countries. Cheaper enforcement or lower wage indicates a favorable FDI
environment. Estimates of Eqs. (24) and (25) are summarized in Table 14. All varieties
of costs have negative impacts on the multinational activities. Statistically signicant
coe¢ cients are found for entry fee f in specications of both equations. However, the
estimated coe¢ cients for exporting costs  have no statistically important impacts on
intrarm trade in all specications of Eq. (25). For trade policy makers, this implies
that a reduction in entry fee may be more e¢ cient than a reduction in unit exporting
costs.
36Related party imports are dened as trade with an entity located outside the U.S. in which the
importer holds at least a 6% equity interest in the exporter. Using Intrarm Importsc as independent
variable creates problems since denitions and government policies on fully-owned a¢ liates di¤er across
countries.
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16 Concluding Remarks
The distinction between extensive and intensive margins of international trade identied
in recent theoretical research also plays an important role in multinational activities,
which are considered as complements to trade. For the U.S., 32% of imports in 2007
were intrarm shipments to multinational parents from their majority-owned a¢ liates as
a result of FDI, let alone the shares of arms-length trade between multinationals and
una¢ liated suppliers from all over the world. The establishment of a new a¢ liate can
contribute up to 2% of intrarm trade on average. This paper addresses the questions
of how many input suppliers should be selected as a¢ liates within the boundaries of a
transnational rm, and how the optimal number of a¢ liates vary across rms and coun-
tries, and in response to movements of trade barriers. Additional empirical examination
of rmscharacteristics and their investment environment that shape the respective con-
tributions of the extensive and intensive margins would be helpful, e.g., investigating a
more disaggregated (6-digit NAICS) and detailed (with FDI origins and destinations)
rm-level panel.
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Part V
Appendix
A Derivations and Proofs for Part II
Necessary Condition for (RP-IPC)
Think of an Arrow-Debreu setup, where domestic bonds that mature at any future
period are traded at period 0. Denote Pm
 
t

=
tY
r=0
pm (r; r+1) the forward price at
period 0 for a t-period matured history-contingent bond in country m. The benets
of having access to international asset market from t on, evaluated at period 0 using
domestic interest rate as discount factor, can thus be summarized in Fmn
 
t
 2 R with
fmn
 
t

given.
Fmn
 
t
  1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm (r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q (r; r+1) f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 ;
where ffmn (r; r+1)gr2[t;1) are the optimal holdings of international bond to (RP). De-
ne another residents maximization problem in the Arrow-Debreu setup, the solution of
which will overlap with the optimal consumption path to (RP) from t on,
Wmn
 
t; bmn
 
t

; Fmn
 
t
  max
fcmn (r)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) ;
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subject to a single budget constraint of Arrow-Debreu type,
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm (r) emn (
r) + Pm
 
t

bmn
 
t

+ Fmn
 
t

>
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm (r) cmn (
r) ;
and the participation constraints in the domestic asset market,
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
 (sjr)U (cmn (s)) > Amn (r) ; 8r > t;
with bmn
 
t

, Fmn
 
t

, and fPm (r)gr2[t;1) given.
Lemma 10 The international participation constraint (RP-IPC) implies Fmn
 
t

> 0,
8t with t 2 [0;1). If (RP-IPC) holds with equality, then Fmn
 
t

= 0, which in turn
implies that (RP) shares identical optimal consumption path with the (RIA) problem.
Proof. Note (RP)s optimal consumption path fcmn (r)gr2[t;1) satises
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) = Wmn  t; bmn  t ; Fmn  t ; 8t;
and by denition of (RIA),
V mn
 
t; bmn
 
t

= Wmn
 
t; bmn
 
t

; 0

; 8t:
Since U () is strictly increasing, Wmn is strictly increasing in Fmn
 
t

. If (RP-IPC) is
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satised at t, then
Wmn
 
t; bmn
 
t

; Fmn
 
t

> Wmn
 
t; bmn
 
t

; 0

;
and from this it follows Fmn
 
t

> 0. Moreover, if (RP-IPC) holds with equality, then
Fmn
 
t

= 0.
Equilibrium Bond Prices
In solving (RIA), Envelope Theorem yields the impact of changes in the inherited
domestic bond holdings on the post-default value.
dV mn
 
t; bmn
 
t

dbmn
 
t
 = mn  t = 1 + mn  tU 0  cm;Dn  t : (RIA-ET)
Denote the conventional marginal rate of substitution by
MRSmn  
U 0
 
cmn
 
t; t+1

U 0
 
cmn
 
t
   t+1jt :
Combine Eqs. (2), (3), (4), and (RIA-ET) to derive for the domestic and international
bond prices, 8>><>>:
pm
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn
1+Amn;2 [1+mn (t;t+1)]Amn;1
1+Amn;3
;
q
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn
1+Amn;2
1+Amn;3
;
where mn
 
t; t+1

is the multiplier of domestic market participation constraint in the
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V mn
  
t; t+1

; bmn
 
t; t+1

problem; and
Amn;1 = 
m
n
 
t; t+1

 t 1
U 0
 
cm;Dn
 
t; t+1

U 0
 
cmn
 
t; t+1
 1

 
t; t+1
 ;
Amn;2 =
t+1X
s=0
X
(t;t+1)js
[mn (
s) + ^mn (
s)]  s

  
t; t+1
 js

 
t; t+1
 ;
Amn;3 =
tX
s=0
X
tjs
[mn (
s) + ^mn (
s)]  s

 
tjs

 
t
 :
When (RP-IPC) is slack at
 
t; t+1

and hence mn
 
t; t+1

= ^mn
 
t; t+1

= 0, two
prices equal to each other,
pm
 
t; t+1

= q
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn ; 8n: (A.1)
In countries with mn
 
t; t+1

> 0, according to Lemma 2, the formula for domestic
bond price collapses to
pm
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn
"
1 +
^mn
 
t; t+1
  mn  t; t+1mn  t; t+1
t+1
 
t; t+1
  
1 + Amn;3
 # ; (A.2)
and its value is lower than the prevailing international bond price,
q
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn
"
1 +
mn
 
t; t+1

+ ^mn
 
t; t+1

t+1
 
t; t+1
  
1 + Amn;3
 # : (A.3)
If (RP-DPC) is slack besides mn
 
t; t+1

> 0, then ^mn
 
t; t+1

= mn
 
t; t+1

= 0
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further simplies bond pricing rules to
8>><>>:
pm
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn ;
q
 
t; t+1

=MRSmn

1 +
mn (t;t+1)
t+1(t;t+1)(1+Amn;3)

:
(A.4)
Proof of Proposition 5
Construct an alternative planners problem (PPa) by adding domestic participation
constraints (RP-DPC) for all types to the (PP) problem, and using the following inter-
national participation constraint instead of (PP-IPC):
NX
n=1
'n
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt

 
rjtU (cmn (r)) > NX
n=1
'nV
m
n
 
t; bmn
 
t

; 8t; (PPa-IPC)
where

bmn
 
t
	
t2[0;1) are the optimal holdings of domestic bond to (RP). With U ()
displaying a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution and an appropriate set of
transfers of initial bond holdings, it can be guaranteed that the optimal consumption
stream described in Denition 1 indeed solves problem (PPa). Since the optimal al-
locations in (PP) are both a¤ordable and individual rational in (PPa), the alternative
planner can do strictly better by relaxing next periods international participation con-
straint (PP-IPC) and hence borrowing more at present history t until (PPa-IPC) at 
t; t+1

binds.
Derivation of (5)
Without loss of generality, consider Country 1 at t = 0. Denote by P (t) =
tY
r=0
p (r)
the price of Arrow-Debreu securities. Use the one-period domestic bond price (7) to
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obtain
P (t) =
8>><>>:
p (pq)
t
2 at t = 2k;
(pq)
t+1
2 at t = 2k + 1:
The capital ow N (t) from Country 1 to 2 ips back and forth,
N (t) =
8>><>>:
xJ   y at t = 2k;
y   xJ at t = 2k + 1:
According to Lemma 10, when discounting all future payments to period 0 using cor-
responding Arrow-Debreu prices, the summation of all present values should equal zero
since Country 1 is internationally participation constrained at period 0.
1X
t=0
P (t)N (t) =
 1X
k=0
pk+1qk
! 
xJ   y+ 1X
k=0
pk+1qk+1
! 
y   xJ
=
p
 
xJ   y+ q  y   xJ
1  pq = 0:
The same method applies to the derivation of (10) in Section 4.3. Notice the international
capital outow at even periods becomes (x "p)  y and the domestic exchange is ".
B Sample Description for Part III
I list below the 73 emerging and developing countries in my baseline sample, for which
key explanatory variables on institutional quality are available at least for 3 years of the
years between 2004 and 2008 for each country.
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Algeria, Angola0, Argentina, Bangladesh0, Bolivia, Botswana0, Brazil, BulgariaT ,
Burkina Faso0, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo0,
Republic of Congo0, Costa Rica, Côte dIvoire, Czech RepublicAT , Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia0, Gabon0, Ghana0, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti0, Honduras, HungaryAT , India, Indonesia, Iran0, IsraelA, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
Malawi0, Malaysia, Mali0, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, PolandA,
Romania, Russian, Senegal, Sierra Leone0, Slovak RepublicAT , South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Syrian Arab Republic0, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo0, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda0, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam0, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Countries marked with superscript  are OECD member countries; with T transition
economies; with A additional countries made available by IIF; and with 0 countries having
zero private sector debt stocks for all available years.
C Derivations for Part IV
Derivation of Alternative Objective Function
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Use Eqs. (17) and (18) to expand the variety revenue.
Rj = Q
1
P

 p
 
 q
 1

j
= Q
1
P

 p
 


zj

h
ch
h m
cm
m    1

Rj
 1

= QP p 

   1

 1
c
 h( 1)
h c
 m( 1)
m 
h( 1)
h 
m( 1)
m| {z }
K: Factor constant for integration over j
 z 1j : (C.1)
The total brand revenue has two equivalent denitions.
R =
8>><>>:
pq;R
j2
Rjdj:
This equivalence generates an expression for the price index of brand output.
QP p1  = QP p 

   1

 1
c
 h( 1)
h c
 m( 1)
m 
h( 1)
h 
m( 1)
m
Z
j2

z 1j dj:
) p =

   1

 1
c
h
h c
m
m 
 h
h 
 m
m
Z
j2

z 1j dj
 1
(1 )
:
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Substitute this expression into the nal prot function (19).
Z
j2

Rjdj   ch
Z
j2

hjdj   cm
Z
j2

mjdj
=
Z
j2

Rj

1  hh
   1

  mm
   1


dj
=
Z
j2

z 1j dj QP p 

   1

 1
c
 h( 1)
h c
 m( 1)
m


1 

   1


(hh + mm)


h( 1)
h 
m( 1)
m
=
Z
j2

z 1j dj
 1 
1 
QP 

   1

 1
c
 h( 1)
h c
 m( 1)
m


1 

   1


(hh + mm)


h( 1)
h 
m( 1)
m
= Z  A:
Derivation of Optimal Bargaining Share h(h)
Given the consumption composite Q and its corresponding price index P , one can
maximize the following function to nd the optimum,
max
h

1 

   1


(hh + (1  h) (1  h))


h( 1)
h (1  h)(1 h)( 1) ;
with h; h 2 [0; 1].
First order condition is:
 (2h   1) 2h   2h [1 + h (   1)] h + h [1 + h (   1)] = 0:
If h =
1
2
, then it degenerates to a linear equation and h =
1
2
. Otherwise, there are two
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possible solutions to this quadratic function,
h (h) =
h [1 + (   1) h]
p
h [1 + (   1) h] (1  h) [   (   1) h]
 (2h   1)
:
It is required that h(h) must lie within the [0; 1] interval, since it is the fraction of
prot distributed to the HQ. +h (h) is ruled out because it becomes negative if the HQ
services intensity, h, is strictly smaller than
1
2
. Thus, there is one unique and continuous
solution,
h(h) =
8>><>>:
1
2
; if h =
1
2
;
 h (h); otherwise.
Increasing in Productivity
The left hand side of free entry condition (21) can be written as
mRj0(i)  ( + c0m)mj0 = mRj0(i)

1  ( + c
0
m) m
c0m
   1


:
For the open economy problem to be interesting, assume positive prot from exports
before the entry fee is paid.
1  ( + c
0
m) m
c0m
   1

> 0) c0m >
h

( 1)m   1
i :
Given that variable costs in a foreign country is greater than the above threshold, foreign
plant j0s export prot increases in its productivity draw, zj0(i).
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